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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-608
ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. ALBERT KRULL, GEORGE
LUCAS AND SALVATORE MUCERINO
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF ILLINOIS
[February -

, 1987]

JusTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting.
The Court today extends the good-faith exception to the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary... rule, United States v.
Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (1984), in order to provide a grace period
for unconstitutional search and seizure legislation during
which the State is permitted to violate constitutional requirements with impunity. Leon's rationale does not support this
extension of its rule and the Court is unable to give any independent reason in defense of this departure from established
precedent. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The Court, ante, at - - , accurately summarizes Leon's
holding:
"In Leon, the Court held that the exclusionary rule
should not be applied to evidence obtained by a police officer whose reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate was objecti.vely reasonable, even though
the warrant was ultimately found to be defective."
The Court also accurately summarizes the reasoning supporting this conclusion as based upon three factors: the historic
purpose of the exclusionary rule, the absence of evidence
suggesting that judicial officers are inclined to ignore Fourth
Amendment limitations, and the absence of any basis for believing that the exclusionary rule significantly deters Fourth
Amendment violations by judicial officers in the search war-
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rant context. Ibid. In my view, application of Leon's
stated rationales leads to a contrary result in this case.
I agree that the police officer involved in this case acted in
ob ·ective ood faith in executing the search pursuant to Ill.
Rev. tat., c . 5'2, ~ 5-40 e (1981) (repealed 1985). Ante,
at--. And, as the Court notes, ante, at--, n. 13, the
correctness of the Illinois Supreme Court's finding that this
statute violated the Fourth Amendment is not in issue 'here.
Thus, this case turns on the effect to be given to statutory
authority for an unreasonable search.
~e Cou~powerful historical basis for the
exclusion of evidence gathered pursuant to a search authorized by an unconstitutional statute. Statutes authorizing unreasonable searches were the core concern of the Framers of
the Fourth Amendment. This Court has repeatedly noted
that reaction against the ancient Act of Parliament authorizing indiscriminate general searches by writ of assistance, 7 &
8 Wm. III, c. 22, § 6 (1696), was the moving force behind the
Fourth Amendment. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573,
583-584, and n. 21 (1980); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476,
481-482 (1965); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616,
624-630 (1886). James Otis' argument to the royal Superior
Court in Boston against such overreaching laws is as powerful today as it was in 1761:
". . . I will to my dying day oppose with all the powers and faculties God has given me, all such instruments
of slavery on the one hand, and villany on the other, as
this writ of assistance is. . . .
". . . It is a power, that places the liberty of every man
in the hands of every petty officer....
". . . No Acts of Parliament can establish such a writ;
though it should be made in the very words of the petition, it would be void. An act against the constitution is
void." 2 Works of John Adams 523-525 (C. Adams ed.
1850).
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See Paxton's Case, Quincy 51 (Mass. 1761). James Otis lost
the case he argued; and, even had he won it, no exclusionary
rule existed to prevent the admission of evidence gathered
pursuant to a writ of assistance in a later trial. But, history's court has vindicated Otis. The principle that no legislative act can authorize an unreasonable search became embodied in the Fourth Amendment.
Almost 150 years after Otis' argument, this Court found it
necessary, in order to effectively enforce the constitutional
prohibition, to hold that evidence gathered in violation of the
Fourth Amendment would be excluded in federal criminal
trials. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914). In
Mapp_ v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), the rule was further extended to s tate criminal trials. This exclusionary rule has,
of course, been regularly applied to evidence gathered under
statutes that authorized unreasonable searches. See, e. g.,
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85 (1979) (statute authorized
search and detention of persons found on premises being
searched pursuant to warrant); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442
U. S. 465 (1979) (statute authorized search of luggage of persons entering Puerto Rico); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973) (statute authorized search of
automobiles without probable cause within border areas);
Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968) (statute authorized
frisk absent constitutionally required suspicion that officer
was in danger); Bergerv. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (permissive eavesdrop statute). Indeed, Weeks itself made clear
that the exclusionary rule was intended to apply to evidence
gathered by officers acting under "legislative . . . sanction."
Weeks v. United States , supra, at 394.
Leon on its face did not purport to disturb these rulings.
" 'Those decisions involved statutes which, by their own
terms, authorized searches under circumstances which did
not satisfy the traditional warrant and probable-cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. ' Michigan v.
DeFiltippo, 443 U. S., at 39. The substantive Fourth
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Amendment principles announced in those cases are fully
consistent with our holding here." United States v. Leon,
468 U. S., at 912, n. 8. In short, both· the history of the
Fourth Amendment and this Court's later interpretations of
it, support application of the exclusionary rule to evidence
gathered under the 20th century equivalent of the act authorizing the writ of assistance.
This history also supplies the evidence that Leon demanded for the proposition that the relevant state actors,
here legislators, might pose a threat to the values embodied
in the Fourth Amendment. Legislatures have, upon occasion, failed to adhere to the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, as the cited cases illustrate. Indeed, as noted,
the history of the Amendment suggests that legislative abuse
was precisely the evil the Fourth Amendment was intended
to eliminate. In stark contrast, the Framers did not fear
that judicial officers, the state actors at issue in Leon, posed a
serious threat to Fourth Amendment values. James Otis is
as clear on this point as he was in denouncing the unconstitutional Act of Parliament:
"In the first place, may it please your Honors, I will
admit that writs of one kind may be legal; that is, special
writs, directed to special officers, and to search certain
houses, &c. specially set forth in the writ, may be
granted by the Court of Exchequer at home, upon oath
made before the Lord Treasurer by the person who asks
it, that he suspects such goods to be concealed in those
very places he desires to search." 2 Works of John
Adams 524 (C. Adams ed. 1850).
The distinction drawn between the legislator and the judicial
officer is sound. The judicial role is particularized, fact-specific and nonpolitical. Judicial authorization of a particular
search does not threaten the liberty of everyone, but rather
authorizes a single search under particular circumstances.
The legislative act, on the other hand, sweeps broadly, authorizing whole classes of searches, without any particular-

l
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ized showing. A judicial officer's unreasonable authorization
of a search affects one person at a time; a legislature's unreasonable authorization of searches may affect thousands or
millions and will almost always affect more than one. Certainly the latter poses a greater threat to liberty.
Moreover, the Leon court relied explicitly on the tradition
of judicial independence in concluding that, until it was presented with evidence to the contrary, there was relatively little cause for concern that judicial officers might take the
opportunity presented by the good-faith exception to authorize unconstitutional searches. "Judges and magistrates are
not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial
officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions." United States v. Leon, supra, at 917.
Unlike police officers, judicial officers are not "engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). The legislature's objective in passing a law authorizing unreasonable
searches, however, is explicitly to facilitate law enforcement.
Fourth Amendment rights have at times proved unpopular; it
is a measure of the Framers' fear that a passing majority
might find it expedient to compromise Fourth Amendment
values that these values were embodied in the Constitution
itself. Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 544 (1897).
Legislators by virtue of their political role are more often
subjected to the political pressures that may threaten Fourth
Amendment values than are judicial officers.
Finally, I disagree with the Court that there is "no reason
to believe that applying the exclusionary rule" will deter legislation authorizing unconstitutional searches. Ante, at
- - . "The inevitable result of the Constitution's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures and its requirement that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause is
that police officers who obey its strictures will catch fewer
criminals." Stewart, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1393 (1983).
Providing legislatures a grace period during which the police
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may freely perform unreasonable searches in order to convict
those who might have otherwise escaped creates a positive
incentive to promulgate unconstitutional laws. Cf. Weeks v.
United States, 232 U. S., at 392-393. While I heartily agree
with the Court that legislators ordinarily do take seriously
their oaths to uphold the Constitution and that it is proper to
presume that legislative acts are constitutional, ante, at--,
'it cannot be said that there is no reason to fear that a particular legislature might yield to the temptation offered by the
Court's good faith exception.
Accordingly, I find that none of Leon's stated rationales,
see ante, at - -, supports the Court's decision in this case.
History suggests that the exclusionary rule ought to apply to
the unconstitutional legislatively authorized search and this
historical experience provides a basis for concluding that legislatures may threaten Fourth Amendment values. Even
conceding that the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in
this context is arguable, I am unwilling to abandon both history and precedent weighing in favor of suppression. And if
I were willing, I still could not join the Court's opinion because the rule it adopts is both difficult to administer and
anomalous.
The scope of the Court's good-faith exception is unclear.
Officers are to be held not "to have acted in good faith reliance upon a statute if its provisions are such that a reasonable officer should have known that the statute was unconstitutional. Cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818
(1982)." Ante, at--. I think the Court errs in importing
Harlow's "clearly established law" test into this area, because it is not apparent how much constitutional law the reasonable officer is expected to know. In contrast, Leon simply instructs courts that police officers may rely upon a
facially valid search warrant. Each case is a fact-specific
self-terminating episode. Courts need not inquire into the
officer's probable understanding of the state of the law except in the extreme instance of a search warrant upon which
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no reasonable officer would rely. Under the decision today,
however, courts are expected to determine at what point a
reasonable officer should be held to know that a statute has,
under evolving legal rules, become "clearly" unconstitutional.
The process of clearly establishing com~titutional rights is a
long, tedious and uncertain one. Indeed, as the Court notes,
ante, at - - , n. 13, the unconstitutionality of the Illinois
statute is not clearly established to this day. The Court has
granted certiorari on the question of the constitutionality of a
similar statutory scheme in New York v. Burger, 479 U. S.
- - (1986). Thus, some six years after the events in question in this case, the constitutionality of statutes of this kind
remains a fair ground for litigation. Nothing justifies a
grace period of such extraordinary length for an unconstitutional legislative act.
The difficulties in determining whether a particular statute
violates clearly established rights are substantial. See 5 K.
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 27:24, p. 130 (2d ed.
1984) ("The most important effect of [Davis v. Scherer, 468
U. S. 183 (1984)] on future law relates to locating the line between established constitutional rights and clearly established constitutional rights. In assigning itself the task of
drawing such a line the Court may be attempting the impossible. Law that can be clearly stated in the abstract usually
becomes unclear when applied to variable and imperfectly understood facts ... "). The need for a rule so difficult of application outside the civil damages context is, in my view, dubious. Fairness to the defendant, as well as public policy,
dictates that individual government officers ought not be subjected to damages suits for arguable constitutional violations.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 807 (1982) (citing Butz
v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 506 (1978)). But suppression
of illegally obtained evidence does not implicate this concern.
Finally, I find the Court's ruling in this case at right angles, if not directly at odds, with the Court's recent decision
(1986). In Griffith,
in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. -
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the Court held that 1'basic norms of constitutional adjudication" and fairness to ·similarly situated defendants, id., at
- -, require that we give our decisions retroactive effect to
all cases not yet having reached final, and unappealable,
judgment. While the extent to which our decisions ought to
be applied retroactively has been the subject of much debate
among members of the Court for many years, id., at
- - - - - , there has never been any doubt that our decisions are a.pplied to the parties in the case before the Court.
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 301 (1967). The novelty of
the approach taken by the Court in this case is illustrated by
the fact that under its decision today, no effective remedy is
to be provided in the very case in which the statute at issue
was held unconstitutional. I recognize that the Court today,
as it has done in the past, divorces the suppression remedy
from the substantive Fourth Amendment right. See United
States v. Leon, 468 U. S., at 905-908. It must be acknowledged also that the exclusionary rule is a "judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved." United States
v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974). Moreover, the exclusionary remedy is not made available in all instances when
Fourth Amendment rights are implicated. See, e. g. , Stone
v. Powell , 428 U. S. 465 (1976) (barring habeas review of
Fourth Amendment suppression claims); United States v.
Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976) (no suppression remedy for state
Fourth Amendment violations in civil proceedings by or
against the United States). Nevertheless, the failure to
apply the exclusionary rule in the very case in which a state
statute is held to have violated the Fourth Amendment destroys all incentive on the part of individual criminal defendants to litigate the violation of their Fourth Amendment
rights. In my view, whatever "basic norms of constitutional
adjudication," Griffith v. Kentucky, supra, at - - , otherwise require, surely they mandate that a party appearing be-
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fore the Court might conceivably benefit from a judgment in
his favor. The Court attempts to carve out a proviso to its
good faith exception for those cases in which "the legislature
wholly abandoned its responsibility to enact constitutional
laws." Ante, at--. Under what circumstances a legislature can be said to have "wholly abandoned" its obligation to
pass constitutional laws is not apparent on the face of the
Court's opinion. Whatever the scope of the exception, the
inevitable result of the Court's decision to deny the realistic
possibility of an effective remedy to a party challenging statutes not yet declared unconstitutional is that a chill will fall
upon enforcement and development of Fourth Amendment
principles governing legislatively authorized searches.
For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ILLINOIS v. ALBERT KRULL, GEORGE LUCAS AND
SALVATORE MUCERINO
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF ILLINOIS
No. 85-608.

Decided March-, 1986

THE CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting.
On July 5, 1981, Officer McNally of the Chicago Police Department conducted a search of the premises of the Action
Iron and Metal Company which revealed the presence of several motor vehicles that had been reported as stolen. The
officer proceeded pursuant to Illinois Vehicle Code
§ 5-401(e), Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95 12, § 5-401(e) (1981), which at
the time authorized warrantless "examination[s]" of the business premises of automotive parts dealers, scrap processors
and parts recyclers. The next da the statute was declared
unconstitutional by a Federal istric Court in a whol y unrelated ~e_.Q,_n ~~~~ a 1 ve e over roa 1scre ion
in "'tiie police. - See- Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v.
Fahner, 518 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
As a result of this discovery of the stolen cars respondents
were charged with various counts related to the possession of
stolen vehicles and false vehicle identification number plates.
The trial court initially granted respondents' motion to suppress the evidence after finding that the cars had been discovered without a warrant, probable cause or consent, and
concluding that the inspection statute was unconstitutional
on the basis of the District Court's holding in Bionic Auto

Parts.
During the pendency of an appeal by the State to the Illinois Appellate Court, the Illinois legislature revised the statute to conform with Fourth Amendment standards. Because of this revision, an injunction issued in Bionic Auto
Parts against enforcement of the statute was rendered moot
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and was subsequently vacated. 721 F. 2d 1072 (CA7 1983).
The Illinois Appellate Court thereafter remanded this case to
the trial court to reconsider the constitutionality of§ 5-401(e)
prior to its revision and to consider whether the good-faith
reliance on the statute by Officer MeN ally was relevant to
whether the evidence should be suppressed. On remand,
the trial court again ruled that former§ 5-401(e) was invalid,
and further ruled that the officer's good-faith reliance on the
statue was irrelevant.
The State took a direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme
Court, which affirmed. 107 Ill. 2d 107, 481 N. E. 2d 703
(1985). That court agreed that the statute was unconstitutional because it "vested State officials with too much discretion to decide who, when, and how long to search." Id., at
116, 481 N. E. 2d, at 707. It then rejected the State's claim
that evidence from a search made in good-faith reliance on
§ 5-401(e) prior to any ruling that the statute was invalid
should not be suppressed. In so holding, the court relied on
//Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31, 35-38 (1970), where
this Court held that an arrest made in good-faith reliance on a
Detroit ordinance was valid, together with a search incident
to that arrest, despite the subsequent determination that the
ordinance itself was unconstitutional. See 107 Ill. 2d, at
117-119, 481 N. E. 2d, at 708. The Illinois court reasoned
that
"the Supreme Court in DeFillippo distinguished between substantive laws, which define criminal offenses,
and procedural laws, which directly authorize searches.
An arrest and search conducted pursuant to a substantive law, like the Detroit ordinance, will be upheld, provided the officer has probable cause to make the arrest
and he relied on the statute in good faith. In contrast,
an arrest and search made pursuant to a procedural statute, not yet declared unconstitutional, and which authorizes unlawful searches, will not be upheld, even though
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the arrest and search were made in good-faith reliance
on the statute." Id., at 118, 481 N. E. 2d, at 708.
The Illinois court assumed that this Court "continues to utilize the substantive-procedural dichotomy in determining
whether a search conducted pursuant to a .statute was valid."
Ibid. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. - - (1984)).
It is true that we have carved out a forbidden "category of
statutes purporting to authorize searches without probable
cause, which the Court has not hesitated to hold invalid as
authority for unconstitutional searches." Ybarra v. Illinois,
444 U. S. 85, 96, n. 11 (1979). See, e. g., Torres v. Puerto
Rico, 442 U. S. 465 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S.
40 (1968); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967). Moreover, our opinions in Leon and DeFillippo further intimated
that an officer's good-faith reliance on such procedural statutes would be irrelevant in determining whether to suppress
the evidence of a search under this line of precedent. See
Leon, 468 U. S., a t - , n. 8; DeFillippo, 443 U. S., at 39.
None of these cases, however, squarely addressed that
issue, which is presented in this case. No one disputes that
such statutes may no longer be relied upon by police once
they are declared constitutionally infirm. But noticeably absent from the Court's discussions in Leon and DeFillippo of
this string of cases is any reference to the only case directly
on point, United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531 (1975).
In Peltier, Border Patrol agents conducted a warrantless
search of an automobile pursuant to a procedural statute and
supporting regulations subsequently held invalid by this
Court in Almeida-Sanchez, supra. Nevertheless, we refused to apply Almeida-Sanchez retroactively to suppress
the evidence of the search when the Border Patrol agents had
acted in good-faith reliance on the statute and regulations before they were declared invalid. The Court's reasoning was
based principally on recognition that suppression of the evidence would serve no valid purpose of the exclusionary rule:

4
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"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct then evidence obtained from a
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly
be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment." 422 U. S.,
at 542.
In reaching this holding, the Court explicitly noted that
Almeida-Sanchez did not control because in that case the
issue of good-faith reliance had never been raised by the Government. I d., at 542, n. 12.
Nor should Peltier be read as some aberration from
precedent as to good-faith reliance on a statute and the propriety of suppression generally. For example, despite the
dicta in Leon to the contrary, the Court's reasoning there
clearly supports our holding in Peltier. In Leon we refused
to suppress evidence seized in good-faith reliance on a warrant later held to be invalid. We observed that the principal
purpose behind the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct. 468 U. S., at - - . And in order for exclusion
of evidence to have a deterrent effect, "it must alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of
their departments." I d., at - - .
Indeed, Leon quoted the language from Peltier quoted
above, see 468 U. S., at-- (quoting 422 U. S., at 542), and
further quoted the following passage from Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974), which was reiterated in Peltier,
422 U. S., at 439:
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or
at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived
the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope
to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in
their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official con-
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duct was pursued in complete good faith, however, the
deterrence rational loses much of its force." Leon, 468
U. S., at-- (quoting 417 U. S., at 447).
In recognition of this central purpose, no Fourth Amendment interests would be advanced by suppressing evidence
when the deterrent value from such suppression would be nil.
As in Leon, suppressing evidence seized by officers relying in
good faith on what they reasonably believed to be a valid procedural statute could hardly alter their behavior in any desirable fashion.
The dicta in Leon and DeFillippo conflicts directly with the
Court's holding in Peltier, and accordingly clarification for
the benefit of other courts is called for. Because this case
squarely presents the issue, I would grant the State's petition for certiorari and clarify the relevant law.
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Decided March - , 1986

THE CHIEF JUSTICE, with whom JUSTICE POWELL joins,
dissenting.
On July 5, 1981, Officer McNally of the Chicago Police Department conducted ~h of the premises of the Action
Iron and Metal Company which revealed the presence of several motor vehicles that had been reported as stolen. The
officer proceeded pursuant to Illinois Vehicle Code
§ 5-401(e), Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 9512, § 5-401(e) (1981), which~
the time authorized warrantless "examination[s]" of the business premises of automotive parts dealers, scrap processors
and parts recyc ers.
he next day e statuteWas declared
unconstitutional by a Federal District Court in a wholly unrelated case on the ground that it vested overbroad discretion
in the police. See Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v.
Fahner, 518 F. Supp. 582 (ND Ill. 1981).
As a result of this discovery of the stolen cars, respondents
were charged with various counts related to the possession of
stolen vehicles and false vehicle identification number plates.
The trial court initially granted respondents' motion to suppress the evidence after finding that the cars had been discovered without a warrant, probable cause or consent, and
concluding that the inspection statute was unconstitutional
on the basis of the District Court's holding in Bionic Auto

Parts.
During the pendency of an appeal by the State to the Illinois Appellate Court, the IlJinois le_gis~ture revised the.statute to conform with Fourth Amendment standards. Because of this revision, an injunction issue m Bionic Auto
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Parts against enforcement of the statute was rendered moot
and was subsequently vacated. 721 F. 2d 1072 (CA7 1983).
The Illinois Appellate Court thereafter remanded this case to
the trial court to reconsider the constitutionality of§ 5-401(e)
prior to its revision and to consider whether the good-faith
reliance on the statute by Officer MeN ally was relevant to
whether the evidence should be suppressed. On remand,
the trial court again ruled that former§ 5-401(e) was invalid,
and furtiier"'ruled that the officer's good-faith reliance on the
statue was irrelevant.
The State took a direct appeal to the Illinois Supre¥le
Court, which affirmed. 107 Ill. 2d 107, 481 N. E. 2d 703
(i985). That court agreed that the statute was unconstitutional because it "vested State officials with too much discretion to decide who, when, and how long to search." I d., at
116, 481 N. E. 2d, at 707. It then re,kcted the State's clllim
that evidence from a search made in good-faith reliance on
§ 5-401(e) prior to any ruling that the statute was invalid
should not be suppressed. In so holding, the court relied on
../Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31, 35-38 (1970), where
this Court held that an arrest made in good-faith reliance on a
Detroit ordinance was valid, together with a search incident
to that arrest, despite the subsequent determination that the
ordinance itself was unconstitutional. See 107 Ill. 2d, at
117-119, 481 N. E. 2d, at 708. The Illinois court reasoned
that
.fl..~ . ~ /"the Supreme Court ir/l:_eFillippo distinguished between substantive laws, which define criminal offenses,
.------anaprocedural f~;s, which directly authorize searches.
An arrest and search conducted pursuant to a substantive law, like the Detroit ordinance, will be upheld, provided the officer has probable cause to make the arrest
and he relied on the statute in good faith. In contrast,
an arrest and search made pursuant to a procedural statute, not yet declared unconstitutional, and which authorizes unlawful searches, will not be upheld, even though

-
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the arrest and search were made in good-faith reliance
on the statute." !d., at 118, 481 N. E. 2d, at 708.
The Illinois court assumed that this Court "continues to utilize the '§ubstantive-procedural dichotomy\'in determining
whether a search conducted pursuant to a statute was valid."
Ibid. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. - - (1984)).
It is true that we have carved out a forbidden "category of
statutes purporting to authorize searches without probable
cause, which the Court has not hesitated to hold invalid as
authority for unconstitutional searches." Ybarra v. Illinois,
444 U. S. 85, 96, n. 11 (1979). See, e. g., Torres v. Puerto
Rico, 442 U. S. 465 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S.
40 (1968); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967). Moreover, our opinions in Leon and DeFillippo further intimated
that an officer's good-faith reliance on such procedural statutes would be irrelevant in determining whether to suppress
the evidence of a search under this line of precedent. See
Leon, 468 U. S., at - - , n. 8; DeFillippo, 443 U. S., at 39.
None of these cases, however, squarely addressed that
issu'e;\Vhich is presented in this case-:- No one disputes that
~h statUteSmay no longer be relied upon by police once
they are declared constitutionally infirm. But noticeably absent from the Court's discussions in Leon and DeFillippo of
this string of cases is any reference to the only case direcpy J
o~int, United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531 (1975).
In Peltier, Border Patrol agents conducted a warrantless
search of an automobile pursuant to a procedural statute and
supporting regulations subsequently ~ by this
Court in Almeida-Sanchez, supra. Nevertheless, we refused t_o~~~~Y to suppress
tile evidence of the search when the Border Patrol agents had
acted in good-faith reliance on the statute and regulations before they were declared invalid. The Court's reasoning was
based principally on recognition that suppressiol}_ of the evidence would serve no valid purpose ofthe exclusionary rule:

4
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"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct then evidence obtained from a
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly
be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment." 422 U. S.,
at 542.
In reaching this holding, the Court explicitly noted that
Almeida-Sanchez did not control because in that case the
issue of good-faith reliance had never been raised by the Government. I d., at 542, n. 12.
Nor should Peltier be read as some aberration from
prece ent as to good-faith reliance on a sta u e and the propriety of suppression generally. For example, despite the
dicta in Leon to the contrary, the Court's reas~g_Qlere
crearry--3~ in Pertwr. !n-Lean we refused
to suppress evidence seized m good-faith reliance on a warrant later held to be invalid. We observed that the prinCIPal
pm:pose behind the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct. 468 U. S., at--. And in order for exclusion
of evidence to have a deterrent effect, "it must alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of
their departments." I d., at - - .
Indeed, Leon uoted the language from Peltier quoted
. ., a
2), and
above, see 4681:. ., at-- (quotmg 2
IilrtRer quoted the following passage from Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974), which was reiterated in Peltier,
422 U. S., at 439:
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or
at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived
the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope
to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in
their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official con-

I
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duct was pursued in complete good faith, however, the
deterrence rational loses much of its force." Leon, 468
U. S., at-- (quoting 417 U. S., at 447).
In recognition of this central purpose, no Fourth Amendment interests would be advanced by suppressing evidence
when the deterrent value from such suppression would be nil.
As in Leon, suppressing evidence seized by officers relying in
good faith on what they reasonably believed to be a valid procedural statute could hardly alter their behavior in any desirable fashion.
The dicta in Leon and DeFillippo conflicts directly with the
Court's holding in Peltier, and accordingly clarification for
the benefit of other courts is called for. Because this case
squarely presents the issue, I would grant the State's petition for certiorari and clarify the relevant law.

•, (
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This case was CFR'ed, and
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Timely

a response is now in.

~his

supplemental memo is not primarily designed to summarize the
reply, which is largely a repetition of the reasoning in the
opinion below.l

The reason for this supplemental memo is that,

lThe reply, which largely tracks the reasoning of
S.Ct., does not directly rebut petr's argument as
States v. Peltier, 422 u.s. 531 (1975), should be
Resps simply c1te to the dicta from United States
(Footnote

the Ill.
to why United
controlling.
v. Leon, 104
continued)

-2,./ -

having looked at the petition again, I wish to suggest a possible

/

way of distinguishing United States v. Peltier, 422 u.s. 531
(1975), and answering petr's argument that the good faith
- ~

exception should apply in this case involving an officer's
~ - -~v-~

reliance on a defective procedural statute.
The Court's opinion in Peltier emphasizes the fact that the
holding in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 u.s. 266 (1976),
was unexpected, in that the INS regulation held unconstitutional
in Almeida-Sanchez had been in place over twenty years and had
been uniformly upheld in the Courts of Appeals prior to being
struck down in Almeida-Sanchez.

See 422 u.s. at 540-541.

Although Peltier contains some fairly broad language to the
effect that suppression is proper "only if it can be said that
the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be

(Footnote 1 continued from previous page)
s.ct. 3405, 3415 n. 8, and Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 u.s. 31,
39, that the Ill S.Ct. relied on in its opinion.
(For detail on
the Ill. s.ct.'s opinion and petr's argument, please see the
original pool memo.)
The only point in the reply that is other than wholly predictable
is resps' assertion that at the original suppression hearing, the
trial court held that the detective who searched resps' premises
exceeded his authority under the statute. Resps argue that this
holding precludes this Court from reaching the issue of good
faith reliance on the statute. I disagree. The Ill. s.ct.
op1n1on in this case in no way relies on any holding that the
officer exceeded his statutory authority, and doesn't even
mention that the issue was argued. As noted in the original pool
memo at page 8, it probably is true that if this case is granted,
and if the Ill. s.ct.'s holding that the "good faith" exception
doesn't apply is reversed, a remand will be necessary on the
issue of whether the record supports a finding of good faith.
But that's not a reason not to grant, since the issue of the
officer's good faith in this case is of no general interest
anyway.

-3-

charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment," 422 u.s. at 542, the holding in
Peltier can be seen simply as a refusal to retroactively apply a
"new" Fourth Amendment rule.

See 422 u.s. at 535-539 (extensive

discussion of retroactivity doctrine in cases involving the
exclusionary rule).
When the Court says in United States v. Leon, 104 S.Ct.
3405, 3415e

that "the exclusionary rule requires _<:'ppression

of evidence obtained in searches carried out pursuant to
statutes, not yet declared unconstitutional, purporting to
~

~------

authorize searches and seizures without
warrants," 104 s.ct. at 3415 n.B, the
cases cited as supporting
________.....,.

---

authority are, with the exception of Almeida-Sanchez, not cases

'-----

involving new Fourth Amendment rules.

Since there's no

~~

indication in Leon that the Court considered Peltier
questionable, I would conclude that what the Court had in mind in
footnote 8 was the usual situation where overturning an
unconstitutional procedural statute does not involve retroactive
application of a new Fourth Amendment rule.

In that case,

Almeida-Sanchez shouldn't have been cited, in the interest of
avoiding possible confusion.2

(The same is true of the citation

of Almeida-Sanchez in DeFillippo, 443 u.s. at 39.)

/
(
~

2while the holding in Almeida-Sanchez at first glance fits the
language of the Leon footnote, Peltier makes clear that the
holding in Almeida-Sanchez wasn't required on the grounds that
~ reliance on the 1nval1d INS regulation automatically required
application of the exclusionary rule. In Peltier, 422 u.s. at
542 n. 12, the Court notes that in ~lmeida-Sanchez the government
did not argue for a good-faith except1on to the exclusionary
(Footnote continued)
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A rule reconciling t .h e holding in Peltier and the language
quoted supra from Leon's footnote 8 (and the virtually identical

-

language from DeFillippo)-~d go as follows:

The officer's

good faith reliance on a procedural statute is only relevant if
the invalidation of the statute involves application of a new
Fourth Amendment rule announced by this Court after the date of
the search in question.

The question is whether such a rule

makes sense as a matter of policy.

Two possible rationales occur

to me:
1) The rule can be seen as making the officer who relies on
an invalid procedural statute show that his reliance was not only
reasonable, but that no matter how diligently he had considered
the matter, he still would have concluded, on the basis of
controlling law at the time of the search, that the search was
legal.

This "super good faith" requirement can be explained on

the theory that it gives the officer an incentive to be
especially sure before he bypasses the magistrate and searches
without a warrant.

Alternatively, the rule can be seen as based

on the fact that if the officer had applied for a warrant, the
magistrate would almost certainly have granted it, in which case
the good faith exception would have applied.

(Footnote 2 continued from previous page)
rule. The Court also implies that application of a good-faith
exception in Almeida-Sanchez might have created an advisory
opinion problem. Ibid. In Leon, 104 s.ct. at 3422, the Court's
opinion has language rejecting the idea that announcing a Fourth
Amendment ruling but applying the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule creates advisory opinion problems. For
purposes of considering the present case, it makes no difference
whether or not the holding in Almeida-Sanchez was required by
Article III considerations.

-5-

\

A possible rejoinder would be that this rationale doesn't
work especially well in the context of this case.

The officer

who searched resps' premises didn't suspect that 'a crime had been
committed~

he was carrying out a routine administrative search.

Since the officer had no probable cause to believe a crime had
been committed, he couldn't go to a magistrate for a

warrant~

his

only choices were to act pursuant to the administrative search
statute or not act at all.

Given that a) a properly drafted

administrative search statute could constitutionally authorize
searches of junk yards on less than probable cause, b) the
statute under which the officer acted wasn't clearly
unconstitutional, and c) not acting at all would give "chop
shops" unwarranted freedom to ply their trade, it was (arguably)
not unreasonable for the officers to act pursuant to the statute.
2) Another argument in favor of the rule I described is that
in cases involving invalid procedural statutes, deterrence can
operate not only with respect to the officer, but also with
respect to the legislature.

It is reasonable to expect much more

of a legislature than of an officer, and just because the officer
acted in good faith is not a reason to uphold searches pursuant
to a statute the legislature should have drafted better, or not
at all.
A possible rejoinder would be that, as a practical matter,
legislatures aren't likely to write invalid procedural statutes
with any greater frequency just because the Leon standard will
apply in those cases involving searches made pursuant to such
statutes prior to their invalidation.

Most procedural statutes

-6I

\

probably are (were) constitutional at the time they are (were)
written (which in the case of older statutes may have predated
incorporation of the Fourth Amendment) •

If deterrence of

legislatures is what is intended, the cost of the suggested rule
outweighs any benefit.
Conclusion: If the rule that I have suggested as a possible
way of reconciling Peltier and the relevant passages from Leon
and DeFillippo is acceptable to the Court, there's no reason to
grant in this case.

In holding that exclusion was required in

this case, the Illinois s.ct. did not rely on any new Fourth
amendment doctrine announced subsequent to the search of resps'
junkyard.

(The controlling case, in the Ill. S.Ct's view, is

Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 u.s. 307 (1978), which was
decided over three years prior to the search of resps' premises.)
On the other hand, Justices who favor narrowinq_the

----------------------

exclusionary rule may still consider this case a potential
candidate for a grant.
January 6, 1986

Dimon
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Petitioner challenges lower court's decision

that good faith exception to exclusionary rule does not apply
~

where officers are alleged to have acted in good-faith reliance
on unconstitutional statute authorizing warrantless
~

--------=-

administrative searches of junk yards.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

On July

~'

1981, a detective

from the Chicago Police Department entered the premises of Action

C FK
M~\c:e_,

A

New Wrl t'\\c:.\-e... ~N

Le.-oN "

-2Iron and Metal Company for the purpose of performing a records
inspection pursuant to §5-40l(e) of the Illinois Vehicle Code
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95 1/2, §5-401 (e)) .1

Upon entering

the premises and identifying himself as a police officer, the
detective asked if he could see the yard's license and the
records of vehicles that had been purchased by the yard, and also
if he could examine vehicles in the yard.

~old

by resp Lucas to

"go right ahead," the detective proceeded to discover stolen
vehicles on the premises, which led to the arrests of the three
resps.

Charges were brought against

res~for

possessing stolen

vehicles and possessing false vehicle ID number plates.

an unrelated case declared §5-40l(e) unconstitutional.
Auto Parts et al. v. Tyrone
1981).

c.

Bionic

Fahner, 518 F.Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill.

The Bionic Auto court held that §5-40l(e) did not meet

the standard for statutes authorizing warrantless administrative
searches set out in Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594.2

Although

1 At the time of the search in question, Section 5-40l(e)
provided that:
"Every record required to be maintained under this Section
[governing, inter alia, auto "wreckers" and rebuilders] shall be
opened to inspection by the Secretary of State or any peace
officer for inspection at any reasonable time during the night or
day. Such examination may include examination of the licensee's
established place of business for the purpose of determining the
accuracy of required records."
The statute has since been amended by the Illinois legislature.
2 In Dewey, the Court upheld as reasonable warrantless
administrative searches of mines authorized by the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977 (FMSHA). The Court emphasized "the
substantial federal interest in improving the health and safety
conditions in the Nation's ••. mines," 452 u.s. at 602, and found
that Congress could reasonably conclude that a system of
(Footnote continued)

-3warrantless searches may be necessary to deal with the problem of
"chop shops" dealing in stolen vehicles,

~5-40l(e)

vests overmuch

discretion in inspectors as to "when to search and whom to
search."
~he

518 F.Supp. at 585 (quoting Dewey, 452

u.s.

at 601).

Bionic Auto court noted the evidence of administrative

abuses, such as searches not aimed at verifying proper recordkeeping, stating that while administrative abuses are not per se
a reason to invalidate §5-40l(e), they do point to the existence
of overbroad discretion on the part of inspectors.

518 F.Supp.

at 586.
~he

state TC in the present case granted resp's suppression

motion relating to evidence seized during the search of July 5,
basing suppression upon the holding in Bionic Auto, supra.

~he

subsequent history of the case is summarized by petr as follows:

(Footnote 2 continued from previous page)
warrantless searches was necessary if the law was to be properly
enforced, 452 u.s. at 602-603. ~he Court distinguished the
authorization for warrantless OSHA searches declared
unconstitutional in Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 u.s. 307. The
OSHA search statute "'devolve[d] almost unbr1dled discretion upon
executive and administrative officers, particularly those in the
field, as to whom to search and when to search.'" Dewey, 452
u.s. at 601 (quoting Marshall, 436 u.s. at 601). By contrast,
FMSHA effectively informed m1ne operators that they would be
subject to mandatory administrative searches at least twice
annually for surface mines and four times annually for
underground mines. The Court also noted that the standards with
which mine operators are expected to comply are specifically set
forth in administrative regulations, so that mine operators are
not left wondering about the purposes of an inspec~or or the
limits of his task.
452 u.s. at 604. Furthermore, FMSHA
specifically forbids forcible entries. Administrative inspectors
refused entry must file an injunctive action to bar future
refusals, thus giving operators a chance to show that proposed
searches are outside the inspector's regulatory authority or
infringe overmuch on "unusual privacy interests."
4S2 U.S. at
605.

-4[On appeal from the TC suppression order,] the
Appellate Court of Illinois, First Judicial District,
vacated the judgment of the trial court and remanded
the cause with the suggestion that the trial court
reconsider the constitutionality of section 5-40l(e).
In so doing the Appellate Court specifically directed
that the trial court reconsider this case in light of
the evolving considerations of good faith in cases
before this Court at that time.

[O]n remana ... ,the state trial judge reiterated
his declaration the section 5-40l(e) was
unconstitutional as it existed in July 1981.

The trial

court held that the issue of good faith had no
applicability to reliance on an unconstitutional
statute and reaffirmed his earlier decision suppressing
the evidence.

.••

[Petr] appealed this decision

directly to the Illinois Supreme Court.
Petn at 9, 10.
The Ill.S.Ct. affirmed, finding that the unamend eg version
of §5-40l(e) vested excessive discretion in enforcement officers
and did not define regular enforcement procedures, thus failing
the test for administrative search statutes established in
Donovan v. Dewey, supra.

The court rejected petr's argument

that the search in this case is valid even if §5-40l(e) is not,
because the search was made in good-faith reliance on the
statute.

This Court's cases distinguish between good-faith

-5reliance on a substantive law and good-faith reliance on a
procedural statute which authorizes unconstitutional searches.
See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443

u.s.

31,

3~

(exclusionary

rule not applied to search accompanying arrest for violation of
unconstitutionally vague substantive

statute~

prior cases

involving searches pursuant to unconstitutional procedural
statutes distinguished).
S.Ct. 3405, 3415 n.8

See also United States v. Leon, 104

(reaffirming the teaching of prior cases

that "the exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence
obtained in searches carried out pursuant to statutes, not yet
declared unconstitutional, purporting to authorize searches and
seizures without probable cause or search warrants.")
The Ill.S.Ct. also rejected petr's argument that resp
validly consented to the search of the

~ction

~ucas

Iron premises.

Petr does not challenge this holding in its cert petn.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

A search conducted pursuant to a

procedural statute later held unconstitutional is nevertheless
valid where the search is undertaken in good faith reliance on
the statute.

v

In United States v. Peltier, 422

u.s.

531, this

Court refused to suppress evidence seized by border patrols
---------------...__~~

acting pursuant to an INS regulation authorizing warrantless
------~--~~~.-......~-..._-searches within 100 miles of the border, despite the fact that
~
the regulation in question had been declared unconstitutional in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413

u.s.

266.

This Court's

rationale for refusing to apply Almeida-Sanchez retroactively was
that "evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only
if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge,

-6or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment."

422

u.s.

at 542.

Thus, in Peltier (and numerous other cases, such as United States
v. Leon, supra) this Court has characterized the purpose of the
exclusionary rule as deterrence of police misconduct.

Petr

argues that here, as in Peltier, exclusion of evidence seized in
good-faith reliance on a facially constitutional procedural law
cannot be justified as serving a rational deterrent purpose.
4.

DISCUSSION:

Petr makes a poor choice of words in

arguing that a search pursuant to an unconstltutional procedural
statute is nonetheless "valid" if made in good-faith reliance on
the statute.

~his

~

Court did not hold that the search in Peltier

was valid; rather, accepting the Government's concession that the
search was unconstitutional, the Court refused to apply the
exclusionary rule.

Clearly, though, both petr and Ill.S.Ct.

understood the issue of "validity" to be another way of
considering whether the

exclusiona~y

rule should apply.

Ill.S.Ct. variously phrased the issue as whether the search
should be "upheld," petn app. at 19-20, whether the search was
"valid," id. at 21, and whether good-faith reliance on the
statute could "cure an otherwise illegal search," in.

Since the

only issue before the court was whether the evidence seized
pursuant to the search was properly suppressed, it is probably
overly formalistic to refuse to reach the substantive issue
presented by this petn on account of petr's poor phrasing.
Accordingly, from this point on I will consider the petn as

-7presenting the issue of whether the exclusionary rule was
properly applied in this case.
Petrs have a persuasive point in arguing that Peltier

- ------

implies that a good-faith rule should apply in cases of reliance
by law enforcement officers on a facially constitutional

--------

procedural statute subsequently

~eclared

unconstitutional.

On

the other hand, Ill.S.Ct. also has a persuasive point in noting
that other of this Court's cases, such as DeFillippo and Leon,
seem to imply that reliance on an unconstitutional procedural
statute is subject to more searching scrutiny than reliance on an
unconstitutional substantive statute or reliance on facially
valid warrant. I find it particularly puzzling that this Court in
both DeFillippo, 443

u.s.

at 39,

and Leon, 104 s.ct. at 3415

n.8, cited Almeida-Sanchez, supra, for the proposition that the
exclusionary rule will apply when the search in question is
carried out pursuant to an invalid

procedural statute not

previously declared unconstitutional.

While it is true that the

exclusionary rule was so applied in Almeida-Sanchez, Peltier
would seem to indicate that, had the government argued for a
good-faith exception in ALmeida-Sanchez, this Court would have
agreed.

One way to deal with the language from DeFillippo and

Leon on which the Ill.S.Ct. relied is to note neither case
specifically excludes the possibility that a good-faith exception
could apply to reliance on a procedural statute.

Also, the

language in question can be characterized as dicta, although its
repetition in two cases weighs against dismissing it casually.

-8-

Fairly good arguments could be made both pro and con on the
issue of the officer's objective good faith in this case.

The

statute authorizes a narrower range of searches than OSHA nid,
and serves a more pressing governmental interest, cf. Marshall,
supra, but lacks several of the redeeming features of FMSHA, cf.
Dewey.

However, the questjon of the objective good faith of the

officer in this case is not specifically raised in the petn,
presumably because that question (as opposed to the generic
question of whether a good-faith exception should apply) was not
presented to the Ill.S.Ct.

Thus, were the Court to take the case

and find that a good-faith exception should apply, I assume that
the case would have to be remanded for a hearing on the question
of whether the officer's reliance on §5-40l(e) was objectively
reasonable.

That does not weigh against taking the case, in my

opinion, since it is the issue of whether a good-faith exception
should apply, and not its application tn this particular case,
which is of general interest.
Since the decision below is difficult to reconcile with

----------------

Peltier, and since the question presented seems likely to recur,
this case may be worth plena~ ev i ew. - Petr's poor phrasi ng of
the question presented, both in the lower court and in the petn,
is conceivably a reason to deny cert, though this approach
strikes me as formalistic.

I would assume that if the case is

CFRed and resps treat the question presented as whether the
exclusionary rule was properly applied in this case, there

woul~

be no reason for this Court not to consider this the question
presented.

-95.

RECOHMENDA'I'ION:

CFR with a view to a possible grant.

There is no response.
November 20, 1985

Dimon
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ILLINOIS v. ALBERT KRULL, GEORGE LUCAS AND
SALVATORE MUCERINO
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF ILLINOIS
No. 85-608. Decided March-, 1986

r THE CHIEF JUSTICE, with whom JUSTICE POWELL joins,
dissenting.
On July 5, 1981, Officer McNally of the Chicago Police Department conducted a search of the premises of the Action
Iron and Metal Company which revealed the presence of several motor vehicles that had been reported as stolen. The
officer proceeded pursuant to Illinois Vehicle Code
§ 5-401(e), Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95Y:!, § 5-401(e) (1981), which at
the time authorized warrantless "examination[s]" of the business premises of automotive parts dealers, scrap processors
and parts recyclers. The next day the statute was declared
unconstitutional by a Federal District Court in a wholly unrelated case on the ground that it vested overbroad discretion
in the police. See Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v.
Fahner, 518 F. Supp. 582 (ND Ill. 1981).
As a result of this discovery of the stolen cars respondents
were charged with various counts related to the possession of
stolen vehicles and false vehicle identification number plates.
The trial court initially granted respondents' motion to suppress the evidence after finding that the cars had been discovered without a warrant, probable cause or consent, and
concluding that the inspection statute was unconstitutional
on the basis of the District Court's holding in Bionic Auto

Parts.
During the pendency of an appeal by the State to the Illinois Appellate Court, the Illinois legislature revised the statute to conform with Fourth Amendment standards. Because of this revision, an injunction issued in Bionic Auto
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Parts against enforcement of the statute was rendered moot
and was subsequently vacated. 721 F. 2d 1072 (CA7 1983).
The Illinois Appellate Court thereafter remanded this case to
the trial court to reconsider the constitutionality of§ 5-401(e)
prior to its revision and to consider whether the good-faith
reliance on the statute by Officer MeN ally was relevant to
whether the evidence should be suppressed. On remand,
the trial court again ruled that former§ 5-401(e) was invalid,
and further ruled that the officer's good-faith reliance on the
statue was irrelevant.
The State took a direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme
Court, which affirmed. 107 Ill. 2d 107, 481 N. E. 2d 703
(1985). That court agreed that the statute was unconstitutional because it "vested State officials with too much discretion to decide who, when, and how long to search." Id., at
116, 481 N. E. 2d, at 707. It then rejected the State's claim
that evidence from a search made in good-faith reliance on
§ 5-401(e) prior to any ruling that the statute was invalid
should not be suppressed. In so holding, the court relied on
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31, 35-38 (1970), where
this Court held that an arrest made in good-faith reliance on a
Detroit ordinance was valid, together with a search incident
to that arrest, despite the subsequent determination that the
ordinance itself was unconstitutional. See 107 Ill. 2d, at
117-119, 481 N. E. 2d, at 708. The Illinois court reasoned
that
"the Supreme Court in DeFillippo distinguished between substantive laws, which define criminal offenses,
and procedural laws, which directly authorize searches.
An arrest and search conducted pursuant to a substantive law, like the Detroit ordinance, will be upheld, provided the officer has probable cause to make the arrest
and he relied on the statute in good faith. In contrast,
an arrest and search made pursuant to a procedural statute, not yet declared unconstitutional, and which authorizes unlawful searches, will not be upheld, even though
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the arrest and search were made in good-faith reliance
on the statute." Id., at 118, 481 N. E. 2d, at 708.
The Illinois court assumed that this Court "continues to utilize the substantive-procedural dichotomy in determining
whether a search conducted pursuant to a statute was valid."
Ibid. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. - - (1984)).
It is true that we have carved out a forbidden "category of
statutes purporting to authorize searches without probable
cause, which the Court has not hesitated to hold invalid as
authority for unconstitutional searches." Ybarra v. Illinois,
444 U. S. 85, 96, n. 11 (1979). See, e. g., Torres v. Puerto
Rico, 442 U. S. .465 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S.
40 (1968); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967). Moreover, our opinions in Leon and DeFillippo further intimated
that an officer's good-faith reliance on such procedural statutes would be irrelevant in determining whether to suppress
the evidence of a search under this line of precedent. See
Leon, 468 U. S., at - - , n. 8; DeFillippo, 443 U. S., at 39.
None of these cases, however, squarely addressed that
issue, which is presented in this case. No one disputes that
such statutes may no longer be relied upon by police once
they are declared constitutionally infirm. But noticeably absent from the Court's discussions in Leon and DeFillippo of
this string of cases is any reference to the only case directly
on point, United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531 (1975).
In Peltier, Border Patrol agents conducted a warrantless
search of an automobile pursuant to a procedural statute and
supporting regulations subsequently held invalid by this
Court in Almeida-Sanchez, supra. Nevertheless, we refused to apply Almeida-Sanchez retroactively to suppress
the evidence of the search when the Border Patrol agents had
acted in good-faith reliance on the statute and regulations before they were declared invalid. The Court's reasoning was
based principally on recognition that suppression of the evidence would serve no valid purpose of the exclusionary rule:

4

ILLINOIS v. KRULL

"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct then evidence obtained from a
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly
be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment." 422 U. S.,
at 542.
In reaching this holding, the Court explicitly noted that
Almeida-Sanchez did not control because in that case the
issue of good-faith reliance had never been raised by the Government. I d., at 542, n. 12.
Nor should Peltier be read as some aberration from
precedent as to good-faith reliance on a statute and the propriety of suppression generally. For example, despite the
dicta in Leon to the contrary, the Court's reasoning there
clearly supports our holding in Peltier. In Leon we refused
to suppress evidence seized in good-faith reliance on a warrant later held to be invalid. We observed that the principal
purpose behind the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct. 468 U. S., at - - . And in order for exclusion
of evidence to have a deterrent effect, "it must alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of
their departments." I d., at - - .
Indeed, Leon quoted the language from Peltier quoted
above, see 468 U. S., at-- (quoting 422 U. S., at 542), and
further quoted the following passage from Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974), which was reiterated in Peltier,
422 U. S., at 439:
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or
at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived
the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope
to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in
their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official con-

.

,
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duct was pursued in complete good faith, however, the
deterrence rational loses much of its force." Leon, 468
U. S., a t - (quoting 417 U. S., at 447).
In recognition of this central purpose, no Fourth Amendment interests would be advanced by suppressing evidence
when the deterrent value from such suppression would be nil.
As in Leon, suppressing evidence seized by officers relying in
good faith on what they reasonably believed to be a valid procedural statute could hardly alter their behavior in any desirable fashion.
The dicta in Leon and DeFillippo conflicts directly with the
Court's holding in Peltier, and accordingly clarification for
the benefit of other courts is called for. Because this case
squarely presents the issue, I would grant the State's petition for certiorari and clarify the relevant law.
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MEMO TO FILE:
Section 5-40l(e) of the Illinois Code as of July
5, 1981,

that provided that "every record required to be

maintained
code]

[by

shall

businesses

be

open

officer

at

any

include

examination

established
determining

to

under

the

sections
by

inspection

reasonable

place

other

of

time.

the

of

premises

business

accuracy

Such

of

required

the

the

the

any peace

inspection

of

for

of

may

licensee's
purpose

records."

of

Acting

pursuant to this statute, Detective McNally of the Chicago
police force made a warrantless entry, during the daytime
at

a

reasonable

hour,

of

the

business

premises

of

an

automobile scrap dealer.
The officer identified himself to respondent Lucas
who stated that he was in charge.

The officer requested

that he be allowed to inspect the company's license and
records contained in what was known as the "police book".
R.

26.

documents
vehicles

Lucas
but
that

stated
did
had

that

produce
been

a

he

could

not

yellow pad

purchased.

locate

the

describing

five

According

to

the

2.

state's brief,
an

the officer asked Lucas

inspection of

the vehicles

replied "go right ahead".

R.

in

the

26.

been

computer,

reported

and

discovered

stolen.

arrested Lucas.

He

then

junk yard.

Lucas

Officer McNally noted

the serial numbers of the vehicles,
mobile

if he objected to

checked those on his

that

three

seized

the

Although respondent

of

them

had

vehicles

and

Mucerino was present

he was not arrested until a later date.

Respondent Krull,

a licensee of the business, was not present and could not
be located at that time.
The

only

question

presented,

according

to

the

state's brief, is as follows:
"Whether the exclusionary rule was properly
invoked in the lower court where the predicate
search was authorized by a presumptively valid
statute later
found
to violate the Fourth
Amendment?"
The
more

complex

respondent's
questions,

brief

at

presents

different

and

least one of which does

not

seem to me to be within the scope of our grant.
(i).

See p.

Indeed, the briefs of the parties seem, at times, to

be arguing different cases.

* * *

.).

Our file on this case already is substantial.

It

includes a cert memo and a

supplemental cert memo,

well written.

it includes a printed opinion

In addition,

by the Chief Justice,

in which I

the denial of cert -

the

both

joined, dissenting from

first

vote of the Conference.

Following circulation of the Chief's dissent, the case was
granted - I do not recall by what vote.
I

may

interrupted
district

not

in

court

have

mentioned

dictating

this

subsequently

above

memo)

held,

in

(I

have

that
a

a

been

federal

different

case,

that theillinois statute was invalid because it conferred
unnecessarily

broad

discretion

administrative searches.

on

officers

The trial court,

to

conduct

following

the

decision of the federal DC, granted respondent's motion to
suppress

the

evidence.

appeal now being
agreed

that

rejected

the

made

good

in

the

On

a

irrelevant),
evidence

second

appeal

(the

first

the Illinois Supreme Court
should

state's

argument

that

faith

reliance

on

a

be

suppressed.

the

search

had

presumptively

It
been
valid

statute prior to any ruling that the statute was invalid.
The Illinois court distinguished Michigan v.
443

u.s.

31,

35-38,

that

sustained

the

DeFillippo,

validity

of

an

arrest made in good faith on a presumptively valid Detroit

..

.~·

4.

ordinance
declared

even

though

invalid.

the

laws"

searches).

such

was

{such

{e.g., a criminal statute) and
as

a

authorizing

statute

See the discussion of this distinction in the

Chief Justice's
that

subsequently

The Illinois court made a distinction

between "substantive laws"
"procedural

ordinance

a

opinion

last Term.

distinction

makes

I

sense

am
in

not
the

persuaded
context of

whether the exclusionary should be applied.
The CJ's opinion, and the briefs of the parties,
debate

the

decisions,

dicta,

important cases including:
White's

good

faith

and

relevance

of

several

United States v. Leon {Justice

decision);

Almeida-Sanchez

v.

United

States {with which I am quite familiar); and United States
v. Peltier, 422

u.s.

531 {1975).

The problem presented by

this case is that as recently as Leon, 468
fn.

8,

this Court

u.s.,

at 912,

recognized that the exclusionary rule

may require suppression of evidence obtained in searches
carried

out

pursuant

unconstitutional.

to

statutes

subsequently

declared

Respondent relies heavily on this dicta

in Leon, and on similar statements - all or most of which
are found in cases that I believe can be distinguished.
The Chief's opinion last Term identifies United
States v.

Peltier as

the "only case directly on point".

5.

As

I

well

remember,

warrantless

searches

border

patrol

an

automobile

of

agents

conducted

pursuant

to

a

procedural statute and regulations that were subsequently
held

invalid

in

Almeida-Sanchez.

Nevertheless,

we

declined to apply Almeida-Sanchez retroactively, reasoning
that

suppression

of

the

evidence

would

serve

no

valid

purpose of the exclusionary rule.
This

is

an

exclusionary

rule

case,

and

I

am

influenced substantially by what I wrote in Calandra (the
rule is judge-made not a constitutional mandate),

and in

Stone v. Powell, emphasizing that the purpose of the rule

-----....

is to deter police misconduct.

There is no other rational

reason for a rule that suppresses - as Justice Black said
in one of his dissents that I cited in Stone that

often

is

the

most

reliable

evidence

evidence

that

can

be

presented in a criminal prosecution.
There

is one point argued in respondent's brief

that is not mentioned, as I recall, in either the state's
brief

or

the

amicus

repeatedly

says

officer's

search

unconstitutional
officers

in good

that

brief
the

trial

exceeded
statute".

of

court

the
Even

SG.

the

found

"bounds
assuming

Respondent
that

the

of

the

that

the

faith could rely on the statute at the

0.

time of the search, by its terms the statute was limited
to the "verification of the records".
is made

Thus, the argument

that we do not need to reach the question upon

which we granted certiorari.
I am not yet persuaded there is any merit to this
contention.
officer

The state's brief points out that the police

asked

Lucas

(who

had

stated

objected

to

the

officer's

whether

he

vehicles

in the

right

ahead".

ruled

that

junk yard,
R.

29.

respondent

consent to the search
that

the

The
on

motion
the

is

was

in

charge)

inspecting

that Lucas responded
true

that

had

not

Lucas

the
"go

the trial court
given

effective

(JA 19, 20), but the TC also found

inspection was

statute".
solely

It

and

he

"permissible activity under

to

ground

suppress
that

was

based

the

by

the

the TC

statute

was

unconstitutional.
Subject

to

my

clerk

make

a

more

careful

examination of the question, I would read the TC's ruling
that Lucas had not given effective consent to mean that
Lucas' consent was limited to the response he gave Officer
McNally

as

to

inspecting

the

vehicles.

His

consent

therefore was limited to that extent, and did not embrace

d·"

7.

the officer's warrantless authority to enter the records
that pertain the vehicles.
I

will welcome

the views of my law clerk in a

brief bench memo.

L.F.P., Jr.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ILLINOIS v. ALBERT KRULL, GEORGE LUCAS AND
SALVATORE MUCERINO
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF ILLINOIS
No. 85-608.

Decided March - - , 1986

THE CHIEF JusTICE, dissenting.
On July 5, 1981, Officer McNally of the Chicago Police Department conducted a search of the premises of the Action
Iron and Metal Company which revealed the presence of several motor vehicles that had been reported as stolen. The
officer proceeded pursuant to Illinois Vehicle Code
§ 5-401(e), Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95 'l-2, § 5-401(e) (1981), which at
the time authorized warrantless "examination[s]" of the business premises of automotive parts dealers, scrap processors
and parts recyclers. The next day the statute was declared
unconstitutional by a Federal District Court in a wholly unrelated case on the ground that it vested overbroad discretion
in the police. See Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v.
Fahner, 518 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
As a result of this discovery of the stolen cars respondents
were charged with various counts related to the possession of
stolen vehicles and false vehicle identification number plates.
The trial court initially granted respondents' motion to suppress the evidence after finding that the cars had been discovered without a warrant, probable cause or consent, and
concluding that the inspection statute was unconstitutional
on the basis of the District Court's holding in Bionic Auto
Parts.
During the pendency of an appeal by the State to the Illinois Appellate Court, the Illinois legislature revised the statute to conform with Fourth Amendment standards. Because of this revision, an injunction issued in Bionic Auto
Pa1ts against enforcement of the statute was rendered moot
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and was subsequently vacated. 721 F. 2d 1072 (CA 7 1983).
The Illinois Appellate Court thereafter remanded this case to
the trial court to reconsider the constitutionality of§ 5-401(e)
prior to its revision and to consider whether the good-faith
reliance on the statute by Officer MeN ally was relevant to
whether the evidence should be suppressed. On remand,
the trial court again ruled that former§ 5-401(e) was invalid,
and further ruled that the officer's good-faith reliance on the
statue was irrelevant.
The State took a direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme
Court, which affirmed. 107 Ill. 2d 107, 481 N. E. 2d 703
(1985). That court agreed that the statute was unconstitutional because it "vested State officials with too much discretion to decide who, when, and how long to search." I d., at
116, 481 N. E. 2d, at 707. It then rejected the State's claim
that evidence from a search made in good-faith reliance on
§ 5-401(e) prior to any ruling that the statute was invalid
should not be suppressed. In so holding, the court relied on
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31, 35-38 (1970), where
this Court held that an arrest made in good-faith reliance on a
Detroit ordinance was valid, together with a search incident
to that arrest, despite the subsequent determination that the
ordinance itself was unconstitutional. See 107 Ill. 2d, at
117-119, 481 N. E. 2d, at 708. The Illinois court reasoned
that
"the Supreme Court in DeFillippo distinguished between substantive laws, which define criminal offenses,
and procedural laws, which directly authorize searches.
An arrest and search conducted pursuant to a substantive law, like the Detroit ordinance, will be upheld, provided the officer has probable cause to make the arrest
and he relied on the statute in good faith. In contrast,
an arrest and search made pursuant to a procedural statute, not yet declared unconstitutional, and which authorizes unlawful searches, will not be upheld, even though
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the arrest and search were made in good-faith reliance
on the statute." ld., at 118, 481 N. E. 2d, at 708.
The Illinois court assumed that this Court "continues to utilize the substantive-procedural dichotomy in determining
whether a search conducted pursuant to a statute was valid."
Ibid. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. - - (1984)).
It is true that we have carved out a forbidden "category of
statutes purporting to authorize searches without probable
cause, which the Court has not hesitated to hold invalid as
authority for unconstitutional searches." Ybarra v. Illinois,
444 U. S. 85, 96, n. 11 (1979). See, e. g., Torres v. Puerto
Rico, 442 U. S. 465 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S.
40 (1968); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967). Moreover, our opinions in Leon and DeFillippo further intimated
that an officer's good-faith reliance on such procedn1·al statutes would be irrelevant in determining whether to suppress
the evidence of a search under this line of precedent. See
Leon, 468 U. S., a t - , n. 8; DeFillippo, 443 U.S., at 39.
None of these cases, however, squarely addressed that
issue, which is presented in this case. No one disputes that
such statutes may no longer be relied upon by police once
they are declared constitutionally infirm. But noticeably absent from the Court's discussions in Leon and DeFilltppo of
this string of cases is any reference to the only case directly
on point, United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531 (1975).
In Peltier, Border Patrol agents conducted a warrantless
search of an automobile pursuant to a procedural statute and
supporting regulations subsequently held invalid by this
Court in Almeida-Sanchez, supra. Nevertheless, we refused to apply Almeida-Sanchez retroactively to suppress
the evidence of the search when the Border Patrol agents had
acted in good-faith reliance on the statute and regulations before they were declared invalid. The Court's reasoning was
based principally on recognition that suppression of the evidence would serve no valid purpose of the exclusionary rule:

4
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"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct then evidence obtained from a
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly
be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment." 422 U. S.,
at 542.
In reaching this holding, the Court explicitly noted that
Almeida-Sanchez did not control because in that case the
issue of good-faith reliance had never been raised by the Government. I d., at 542, n. 12.
Nor should Peltier be read as some aberration from
precedent as to good-faith reliance on a statute and the propriety of suppression generally. For example, despite the
dicta in Leon to the contrary, the Court's reasoning there
clearly supports ou holding in Peltier. In Leon we refused
to suppress evidence seized in good-faith reliance on a warrant later held to be invalid. We observed that the principal
purpose behind the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct. 468 U. S., at--. And in order for exclusion
of evidence to have a deterrent effect, "it must alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of
their_ departments." I d., at - - .
Indeed, Leon quoted the language from Peltier quoted
above, see 468 U. S., at-- (quoting 422 U. S., at 542), and
further quoted the following passage from Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974), which was reiterated in Peltier,
422 U. S., at 439:
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or
at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived
the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope
to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in
their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official con-
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duct was pursued in complete good faith, however, the
deterrence rational loses much of its force." Leon, 468
U. S., a t - (quoting 417 U. S., at 447).
In recognition of this central purpose, no Fourth Amendment interests would be advanced by suppressing evidence
when the deterrent value from such suppression would be nil.
As in Leon, suppressing evidence seized by officers relying in
good faith on what they reasonably believed to be a valid procedural statute could hardly alter their behavior in any desirable fashion.
The dicta in Leon and DeFillippo conflicts directly with the
Court's holding in Peltier, and accordingly clarification for
the benefit of other courts is called for. Because this case
squarely presents the issue, I would grant the State's petition for certiorari and clarify the relevant law.

ral 10/01/86

To:

Justice Powell

From:

Bob

October 1, 1986
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No. 85-608, Illinois v. Krull ~
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tl~~f~

Cert. to Ill. Sup. Ct. (Moran, J.)
Wednesday, November 5, 1986 (1st case)

~ ~' ~

~~ ~~

~~~
------------------------------------------~.~~~~~ ~.
Question Presented
Does

the

good

faith

apply to evidence seized

exception

to

BACKGROUND

exclusionary

in reasonable reliance upon a

subsequently found to be unconstitutional?

I.

the

rule

statute

2.

The

Illinois

legislature

has

enacted

a

comprehensive

statute aimed at trafficking in stolen automobile parts.
who operate wrecking yards,

among others, must obtain a license

from the Secretary of State,
identification

numbers of

they purchase or sell.

Persons

and must maintain records of the

all automobiles and

automobile parts

Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 95 l/2, §5-301, 401.2

(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).

When the search and seizure at issue in

this case occurred, the statute provided that:
Every ~rd required to be maintained under this
Section shall be o en to
ection by the Secretary of
State or his author1ze
repres n tive or any peace
officer for inspection at any reasonable time during
the
night
or
day.
Sue
1 spec 1on rna
y de
exam ~ e
remises
of
the - licensee's
place o
business for the purpose of
the a~~~ of re ~ ds.
Id. §5-401 (e)

(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985).

At about 10:30 am on July 5, 1981, Detective McNally of
the Chicago Police Department visited a wrecking yard operated by
resps.
the

McNally identified himself to resp Lucas and asked to see

record of

the yard's automobile purchases.

Lucas answered

that he did not know where to find the formal records, but
McNally a pad of yellow

a er

gave ~

that Lucas said was a record of

vehicles purchased by the yard.

McNally examined the paper and

asked Lucas if he "had any objection to my looking at the cars in
the yard."

Lucas told McNally to "go right ahead."

Petn app. 5-

6.

McNally noted the serial numbers of several cars in the yard.

He

found

that

~ree

of

the

cars

were

stolen,

and

that

--

~L~

the

identification number had been removed from a fourth automobile.

J.a,{_

..__./

3.

He

seized

all

four

automobiles

and

The other

arrested Lucas.

resps were arrested later.
On July

that

held

court

1981,

6,

one

day

after

the

~

search

administrative

the

a

seizure,

federal
was

statute

~

unconstitutional
limitations

because

on

the

Bionic Auto Parts
D.

Ill.

1981),

&

failed

it

discretion
Sales,

vacated

on

of

impose

to

law

sufficient

enforcement

officers.

Inc. v. Fahner, 518 F. Supp. 582
other grounds,

721 F.

2d

1072

(N.
(CA7

1983).

After the DC issued its ruling, but before CA7 heard the

appeal,

the Illinois legislature amended the statute to require

that

inspections

be made during

business hours,

that

they not

last longer than 24 hours, and that they not occur more than six
times

CA7

in any six-month period.

addressed only the amended

statute and found it constitutional.
The
evidence.

state

tc

granted

resps'

motion

to

Lucas

the

The tc concluded that the DC's holding in Bionic Auto

Parts applied to all "pending prosecutions."
that

suppress

did

not

consent

to

Lucas believed he had no right

the

The tc also found

search of

the yard

to refuse permission.

because
The IJ..l .
/

Ct. App. remanded to allow the tc to consider whether the officer
acted

in

decision.
is
The

good

faith,

State

to

consider

the

effect

of

CA7's

On remand, the tc stated that the officer's good faith ~
~

relevant only when
tc

and

reaffirmed
appealed

the officer

its decision

directly

to

the

acts pursuant

to suppress
Ill.

Sup.

to a warrant.

the evidence.

Ct.,

which

The

affirmed.

The Sup. Ct. agreed that the statute was unconstitutional because
\...___,_

it

"vested State

officials with

-

too much discretion to decide

J.LG

S

/cf.

4.

who, when, and how long to search."
cited statements

by this Court

to

Petn app. 16.
support

its holding that

search made pursuant to a procedural statute,
unconstitutional, .

.

The Sup. Ct.
"a

not yet declared

. which authorizes unlawful searches, will

not be upheld, even though the . . • search
faith reliance on the statute."

[was] made in good-

Petn app. 20.

III. DISCUSSION
A.

Was the search permissible under the statute?

Resps

contend that the Court should not consider the possibility of a
good-faith exception because Detective McNally's search exceeded
the bounds of his authority under §504(e).

--

Resps several times

assert that the tc made a finding of fact to this effect.
It

is

undisputed

that:

(1)

the

only

"record"

shown

to

Detective McNally prior to the search was the yellow pad listing
the identification numbers of five vehicles; and (2) that McNally
checked the identification numbers of automobiles on the lot in
addition to the five listed on the yellow pad.
§504 (e)

Resps assert that

authorized only an inspection of the serial numbers on

the five listed vehicles.
Resps rely on the following statement of the tc, made from
the bench:
Had [McNally] only verified the four or five vehicles
that were indicated on this particular sheet of paper,
I think he would have been within his statutory
authority; because the statute says first you check the
records, then you have the opportunity to verify the
records are accurate.
It's a two-step process,
Now,
he didn't do that.

T C.

s

/

df'·

5.

/-r--

J.A.

Although the tc's statements are troubling, I would

29-30.

'I

conclude

that

the

good-faith

three reasons. ~

issue

is

properly presented,

for ·

~

(1) ~&i'L

the tc did not make an explicit finding

. ,/c.
~..u_

that the officer exceeded the bounds of the statute.
had made such · a
should

have

reached

tc' s

does

the

reac~he

courts did
the

finding,

neither the tc nor

interpretation of

not

appear

to

quest1on.

constitutional question,

be

Sup. Ct.

~
c.§k±;J

.

constitutional

If the tc

the Ill.

however.

by

any

S/Ct-

~

~~4-ci.•• f

~ TC s

and ~~~
authority. ~~-

other

~

only because "chop-shop" operators will conceal the evidence of
wrongdoing

if

"chop

Permitting
"temporarily

searches

shop"

misplacing"

are

operators
their

announced
to

records

delay
would

~ -rr~-t-0~

purpose of warrantless searches.
the good-faith exception applies,

in
a

advance.
search

defeat

the

by

whole

Court holds that

the case will ·b-e remanded to

the state court for a determination whether the officer acted in
good

The

faith.

~

state

courts

will

then

have

an

additional

opportunity to determine whether the search was permissible under
the statute.
B.

Does the good-faith exception apply?

United States v. Leon, 468
Calandra, 414
good-faith

u.s.

338

exception

-----

offiCer

c s

1n

u.s.

897

cases

objectively

in

(1984), and United States v.

which

reasonable

subsequently held unconstitutional.

'.

The reasoning of

(1974), strongly supports extension of the

to

the

law

reliance

enforcement
on

tf'"lA..;

TC~j-a- ..c·-i..,."'.

state ~. ~.

Unannounced warrantless searches of wrecking yards are permitted

their

V-

clt..d.. ~I-

the statute seems unreasonable,
supported

..'

a

statute

~

6.

The

exclusionary

rule

is

"a

judicially

created

remedy

designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through
its deterrent effect."
remedial device,
to

those

areas

efficaciously

Calandra, 414

u.s.,

at 348.

"As with any

the application of the rule has been restricted
where

its

served.

Id.

remedial objectives
The

are

decision whether

thought most
to

apply

the

exclusionary rule in a given context turns on "weighing the costs
and

benefits"

of

withholding

reliable

violation of the Fourth Amendment.
In

Leon

the

Court

evidence

stated

that

the

purpose

of

the

468 U.S., at

If a police officer reasonably believes that a statute is

constitutional,
search

basis

suppressed.
affect

the officer cannot be deterred from conducting a

authorized

reasonable

by

the

for

statute has
statute

statute

believing

because
that

the

the

officer

evidence

has
will

no
be

As in Leon, "' [e]xcluding the evidence can in no way

[the officer's]

less willing

the

in

Leon, 468 U.S., at 907.

exclusionary rule is to "deter police misconduct."
916.

obtained

future conduct unless

to do his duty.'"
been held
is

no

468 U.S.,

unconstitutional,
longer

"objectively

it is to make him

at 919-20.

of course,

Once the

reliance on

reasonable."

If

the

statute were "flagrantly abusive of Fourth Amendment rights," the
police officer's reliance on it might be objectively unreasonable
even before a court has passed on the constitutional question.
See Brown v.

Illinois,

422

u.s.

590, 610-11

(1975)

(POWELL, J.,

concurring) •
The Court observed in Leon that "there exists no evidence
suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or

7.

subvert the Fourth Amendment."
reason

to

believe

that

either.

Legislators,

inclination

U.S.,

468

state

at 916.

legislators
including

There is no

have

state

any

such

legislators,

are required by Article VI to take an oath to support the federal
Constitution.
that

Even if legislators were inclined to pass statutes

violate

Fourth

the

Amendment,

application

of

the

exclusionary rule would have a negligible "incremental deterrent
effect."

Judicial

authorizing

review of

searches

is

the constitutionality of

sufficient

exceeding constitutional bounds.
bring

a

pre-enforcement

statute

is

action

unconstitutional

searches

pursuant

to

the

operators

mounted

such

a

to

deter

statutes

legislators

from

In many cases individuals may
seeking

and

a

an

injunction
(Illinois

statute.
challenge

declaration

in

the

that

prohibiting

wrecking

Bionic

the

Auto

yard
Parts

Application of the exclusionary rule would increase

case.)

level of detrrence hardly at all.
The

Court

has

already

held

·
• s goo a- f a1t
· h re 1·1ance on
off1cer

that

a

law

enforcement

~£bstant~
· · 1 ~~
a· nance
~ r1~:na

later held unconstitutional does not JUStify application of the
exclusionary rule.

Michigan v.

DeFillippo,

u.s.

443

31

(1979).

I ~

/I

suggests that the exclusionary rule would apply to a
statute

subsequently

held

to

violate

DeFillippo, 443 U.S., at 39.
is repeated in Leon, 468
however,
moreover,
~

reliance

u.s.,

at 912 n.

8.

these statements are only dicta.
the
on

a

Court

declined

to

exclude

subsequently-invalidated

the

Fourth

The suggestion

Strictly speaking,
In an earlier case,

evidence

border

obtained

search

in

statute.

8.

United

States

precise

v.

Peltier,

question

decided

/~

retroactively the decision
413

u.s.

in

this

422

u.s.

in

Peltier

531

(1975).
was

Although

whether

in Almeida-Sanchez v.

to

the

apply

United States,
~

266 (1973), the reasoning of Peltier supports a reversal
case.

exclusionary

The

rule

Court

is

to

said:

deter

"If

the

unlawful

purpose

police

of

the

conduct

then

evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it
can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge,
may

properly

be

charged

with

knowledge,

that

unconstituional under the Fourth Amendment."
There

is

no

serious

doubt

that

the

search

Detective

McNally's ·

At the time of

the search, the statute had not been held unconstitutional.
including

authorizing
Dewey,

452

this

Court,

warrantless

u.s.

two of

the

before

it was

594

upheld

administrative

(1981).

the

requirements

statute

similar

searches.

Section 5-401 (e)

three constitutional
amended:

have

was

Id., at 542.

reliance on §5-40l(e) was objectively reasonable.

courts,

or

The

statutes

Donovan

v.

clearly satisfied
set out

is directed

in Dewey

at an industry

subject to pervasive regulation, and there is a compelling public
interest in performing inspections without a warrant.

The courts

later held that the statute did not place adequate limitations on
law

enforcement

officers'

requirement under Dewey.
upheld

statute

amendments.

after

the

discretion

to

search,

The statute came close,
state

legislature

made

the

however.
fairly

third
CA7
minor

It seems likely that the search was authorized even

under the amended statute.

(It occurred during business hours;

it lasted less than 24 hours; the yard had not been searched more

~~

~~

9.

than six times in the preceding six months.)
McNally committed
Amendment.

a merely

See Brown v.

At most Detective

"technical" violation of the Fourth

Illinois,

611 U.S., at 610-11

(POWELL,

J., concurring).
C.

Does

this case present a question of retroactivity?

Resps argue that this case presents that question whether Leon
should be applied retroactively.
Court's

grant

of

cert.

The question is not within the

Moreover,

the

question

whether

Leon

should be extended to this statutory context is simply not the
same as the question whether Leon should apply retroactively to
this case.
In any event, resps retroactivity arguments are misguided.
The Court has held
that

is

not

a

that a construction of the Fourth Amendment

"clear

break

with

the

convictions that are not yet final.

u.s.

457

537

~

accord

(1982).

The

Court

past"

applies

United States v.
reasoned

that

to

all

Johnson,

"[f]ailure

to

retroactive effect to Fourth Amendment rulings would

'encourage police or other courts to disregard the plain purport
of

our

decisions

approach.'"

u.s.

244,

Leon

notes

Id.,

277

and

to

at 561,

adopt

let's-wait-until-it's-decided

quoting Desist v.

(Fortas, J. , dissenting) .

that

"nothing

in

Johnson

[limited] good-faith exception."

III.

a

468

United States,

394

The Court's opinion in
precludes

u.s.,

adoption

of

a

at 912 n. 9.

CONCLUSION
The deterrent effect of applying the exclusionary rule in

~

cases

such

as

this

does

not

outweigh

the

cost

of

excluding

t}AA:J

10.

evidence that it "typically reliable and often the most probative
evidence

bearing

Stone v.

Powell,

United States, 394
I

on

the guilt or

428

u.s.

U.S.

465,

innocence of

490

217, 237 Cl969)

(1976),

the defendant."

citing

Kaufman

v.

(Black, J. dissenting).

recommend that you vote to reverse the judgment of the

Ill. Sup. Ct. and remand for further proceedings.

J ~ :l.-s~c: L

..{ .t.J
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I

To:
From:

Justice Powell
Bob

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM

/~
No. 85-608, Illinois v. Krull ~
No. 85-759, Maryland v. Garrison
No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks
Each of

these

three

cases

presents questions

about

the

application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
announced

in United States v.

Leon,

468

u.s.

897

(1984).

This

supplemental memorandum is an attempt to set out a unified approach to these questions.
You will recall that Illinois v. Krull involves an officer's good

faith

reliance on a statute authorizing warrantless

administrative searches.
constitutional.

Maryland v.

officers obtained
searched
Hicks,

the

The statute subsequently was held un-

a

Garrison is the case in which the

valid warrant

apartment

next

to search an apartment,

door

by

mistake.

In

Arizona

but
v.

the officers entered the apartment under exigent circum-

stances and

then moved

stereo components

in order

to read the

serial numbers and determine whether the equipment was stolen.
As
when,

I

read

Leon,

and only when,

-

not deter

.<7."F. . ••.•

the

good

faith

exception

should

apply

application of the exclusionary rule -would
-.

law enforcement officers

from the

illegal search or

)

page 2.

seizure at issue.

This focus on deterrence

is consistent with

your opinion in Stone v. Powell. ~
I

now consider,

briefly,

four

possible

applications of

Leon to these cases in light of the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.
1.

Leon applies only when the officers reasonably rely

on a warrant, and the warrant authorizes their action.
seems to me,

is the narrowest plausible reading of Leon.

This, it
It has

the advantage of establishing a bright-line rule, but at the cost
of

excluding

Hicks.

evidence

in

cases

such

as

Krull,

Garrison,

and

It seems to me that the exception can be extended to per-

mit the jury to consider the evidence in at least some of these
cases without any appreciable reduction in the deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule.
2.
on a warrant,

Leon applies only when the officers reasonably rely
even if the warrant does not authorize their ac-

tion.

This approach would expand the exception to include Garri-

son.

Of course, the magistrate did not authorize the search the

officers actually made, and the officers lacked probable cause to
conduct that search.

Still, it is clear that the officers would

not have acted any differently had they known the evidence would
be excluded.

If the focus is on deterrence,

it seems pointless

to exclude probative evidence because of this mistake.
3.

Leon applies only when the officers reasonably rely

on a warrant or on a statute authorizing warrantless searches.
If the officer is entitled to rely on the magistrate,

I see no

reason why he should not be entitled to rely on the legislature,

·'

page 3.

so long as the statute does not clearly violate the Fourth Amendment.

There is no reason to think that legislatures are inclined

to pass statutes that exceed the bounds of the Fourth Amendment.
This approach would extend the exception to include Illinois v.
Krull.
4.
objectively

Leon

applies

reasonable.

whenever

This

the

seems

to

officer's
me

to

be

behavior
the

is

broadest

reading of Leon that is consistent with a focus on deterrence of
police misconduct.

As

____ ___

a

practical matter,

_________

this approach would

extend
exception......__to cases in which---·
the officer relies on a
'-- - the

--- --.

judicial decision that subsequently is reversed or,

-

at the ex-

treme, conducts a warrantless search that is likely to be constitutional

in

light of

prior

judicial decisions.

This

approach

might allow the evidence obtained in Hicks to be admitted even if
the officer's action is held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.

Although this approach may be sound in theory, I am uncom-

fortable with its practical effect.
expect
vast

police officers
body of

First, it is unrealistic to

to acquire a

Fourth Amendment decisions.

this approach may be quite open-ended.
decisions
trained

detailed

often

turn

on

their

officer

must

often

be

doubt

search or seizure requires a warrant.

Second,

I

the

am afraid

Because Fourth Amendment

particular
in

knowledge of

facts,
whether

even
a

a

well-

particular

If the officer knows that

the evidence will be excluded if his action is held unconstitutional, the officer is more likely to go to a magistrate.

If the

officer knows that the evidence will be admitted if his action

page 4.

was "reasonable" at the time, the officer is more likely to proceed without a warrant.
I

therefore recommend that you apply Leon only when the

officer acts pursuant

t~~ ~

statu:B that the officer

reasonably believes authorizes the search or seizure.

Ron-

ald has authroized me to say that he joins in this recommendation.
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MEMO TO FILE:
I happen to be looking at my opinion in Brown v.
Illinois opinion.

an opinion concurring

in part with the Court

At page 611, I stated:

"At the opposite end of the spectrum lie
• technical'
violations
of
Fourth
Amendment
rights where, for example, officers in good
faith arrest an individual in reliance on a
warrant later invalidated or pursuant to a
statute
that
subsequently
is
declared
unconstitutional.
See United States v. Kilgen,
445 F.2d 280 (CAS)."
I mention this merely to note that my view with
respect to "good faith" where officers rely on a statute
subsequently invalidated has not changed.

L.F.P., Jr.
cc:

Bob

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
Justice Scalia
From:

/

~
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Justice Blackmon
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-608

ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. ALBERT KRULL, GEORGE
LUCAS AND SALVATORE MUCERINO
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF ILLINOIS
[January-, 1987]

~J~ "L/
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In United States v.
468 U. S. 897 (1984) , this Court
-~1-u~
ruled that the Fourth 'iinle'ndment exclusionary rule does not
apply to evidence obtained by police officers who acted ill..Q.b- ~~
jectively reasonable reliance upon a search warrant issued by
~~
a neutral magistrate, but where the warrant was ultimately
found to be unsupported by probable cause. See also ~ 1 /f-/9 ~
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U. S. 981 (1984). The
present case presents the question whether a similar excep- ~
tion to the exclusionary rule should be recognized when offi- -· J
cers act in objectively reasonable reliance upon a sY!tu.1e au- r~ Pk../
thorizing warrantless administrative searches, but wnere the
~~
statute is ultimately found to violate the Fourth Amendment.

a;;m,

~

6

c

ct ~ bu.t v' (1~
The State of Illinois, as part of its Vehicle Code, has a com1-t:. u ~ ~ 1
prehensive statutory scheme regulating the sale of motor ve- ~
r--' ,.-- ._.,
I

.d

hicles and vehicular parts. See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95 112, A1 J
~~ 5-100 to 5-801 (1985). A person who sells motor vehicles, ~,
or deals in automotive parts, or processes automotive scrap
metal, or engages in a similar business must obtain a license
from the Illinois Secretary of State. ~~ 5-101, 5-102, 5-301.
A licensee is required to maintain a detailed record of all
motor vehicles and parts that he purchases or sells, including
the identification numbers of such vehicles and parts, and the
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dates of acquisition and disposition. ~ 5-401.2. In 1981, the
statute in its then form required a licensee to permit state officials to inspect these records "at any reasonable time during
the night or day" and to allow "examination of the premises of
the licensee's established place of business for the purpose of
determining the accuracy of required records." Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 95 112, ~ 5-401(e) (1981). 1
Respondents in 1981 operated Action Iron & Metal, Inc.,
an automobile wrecking yard located in the city of Chicago.
Detective Leilan K. MeN ally of the Chicago Police Department regularly inspected the records of wrecking yards pursuant to the state statute. Tr. 12. 2 On the morning of July
5, 1981, he entered respondents' yard. !d., at 7. He identified himself as a police officer to respondent Lucas, who was
working at the yard, and asked to see the license and records
of vehicle purchases. Lucas could not locate the license or
records, but he did produce a paper pad on which approximately five vehicle purchases were listed. I d., at 25-26.
McNally then requested and received permission from Lucas
to look at the cars in the yard. Upon checking with his mobile computer the serial numbers of several of the vehicles,
McNally ascertained that three of them were stolen. Also,
the identification number of a fourth had been removed.
McNally seized the four vehicles and placed Lucas under
arrest. !d., at 8-9, 16-17. Respondent Krull, the holder of
the license, and respondent Mucerino, who was present at
the yard the day of the search, were arrested later. Respondents were charged with various criminal violations of
the Illinois motor vehicle statutes.
'Paragraph 5-401 of the 1981 compilation was repealed by 1983 Ill.
Laws No. 83-1473, § 2, effective Jan. 1, 1985. Its current compilation
replacement bears the same paragraph number.
2
Citations to the transcript refer to the Sept. 21, 1985, hearing on
respondents' suppression motion held in the Circuit Court of Cook County.
2 Record 24.
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The state trial court (the Circuit Court of Cook County)
granted respondents' motion to suppress the evidence seized
from the yard. App. 20-21. Respondents had relied on a
federal court ruling, issued the day following the search, that
§ 5-401(e), authorizing warrantless administrative searches
of licensees, was unconstitutional. See Bionic Auto Parts &
Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 518 F. Supp. 582 (ND Ill. 1981), aff'd
in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part, 721 F. 2d 1072
(CA7 1983). The Federal District Court in that case had
concluded that the statute permitted officers unbridled discretion in their searches and was therefore not "'a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.'" 518 F. Supp.,
at 585-586, quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594, 603
(1981). The state trial court in the instant case agreed that
the statute was invalid and concluded that its unconstitutionality "affects all pending prosecutions not completed."
App. 20. On that basis, the trial court granted respondents'
motion to suppress the evidence. I d., at 20-21. 3
The Appellate Court of Illinois, First Judicial District,
vacated the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. I d., at 22. It observed that recent developments in the law indicated that Detective McNally's good
faith reliance on the state statute might be relevant in assessing the admissibility of evidence, but that the trial court
should first make a factual determination regarding
McNally's good faith. Id., at 25. It also observed that the
trial court might wish to reconsider its holding regarding the
unconstitutionality of the statute in light of the decision by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upholding the amended form of the Illinois statute. See
Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 721 F. 2d 1072
(CA7 1983). 4 On remand, however, the state trial court
3
The trial court also concluded that Lucas had not consented to the
search. App. 20. That ruling is not now at issue here.
'Following the decision of the District Court in Bionic Auto Parts &
Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 518 F . Supp. 582 (ND Ill. 1981), the Illinois Legisla-
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adhered to its decision to grant respondents' motion to suppress. It stated that the relevant statute was the one in effect at the time McNally searched respondents' yard, and
that this statute was unconstitutional for the reasons stated
by the Federal District Court in Bionic. It further concluded that because the good faith of an officer is relevant, if
at all, only when he acts pursuant to a warrant, Detective
McNally's possible good-faith reliance upon the statute had
no bearing on the case. App. 32-35. 5
The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. 6 107 Ill. 2d 107,
481 N. E. 2d 7 (1 8 . t s rue hat the state statute,
as it existed at the time MeN ally searched respondents' yard,
was unconstitutional. It noted that statutes authorizing
warra~inistrative searches in heavily regulated industries had been upheld where such searches were necessary to promote enforcement of a substantial state interest,
and where the statute" 'in terms of [the] certainty and regularity of its application, provide[d] a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant."' Id., at 116, 481 N. E. 2d,
at 707, quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594, 603 (1981).
Although acknowledging that the statutory scheme authorizing warrantless searches of licensees furthered a strong public interest in preventing the theft of automobiles and the
trafficking in stolen automotive parts, the Illinois Supreme
ture amended the statute to limit the timing, frequency, and duration of
the administrative search. 1982 Ill. Laws No. 82-984, codified, as
amended, at Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 95 112, ~ 5-403 (1985). See n. 1, supra.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not address
the validity of the earlier form of the statute, for it held that the amended
statute satisfied the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See Bionic
Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 721 F. 2d 1072, 1075 (CA7 1983).
5
The trial court also indicated that McNally may have acted outside the
scope of his statutory authority when he examined vehicles other than
those listed on the pad offered by Lucas. App. 29; 5 Record 2, 8.
6
The State bypassed the Illinois intermediate appellate court and appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois pursuant to Ill. S. Ct. Rule
603.
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Court concluded that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment because it "vested State officials with too much discretion to decide who, when, and how long to search." 107 Ill.
2d, at 116, 481 N. E. 2d, at 707.
The court rejected the State's argument that the evidence
seized from respondents' wrecking yard should nevertheless
be admitted because the police officer had acted in good-faith
reliance on the statute authorizing such searches. The court
observed that in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31 (1979),
this Court had upheld an arrest and search made pursuant to
an ordinance defining a criminal offense, where the ordinance
was subsequently held to violate the Fourth Amendment.
The Illinois court noted that this Court in DeFillippo had
contrasted the ordinance then before_ih defining a substantive criminal offense, with a procedural statute directly
authorizing searches without a warrant or probable cause,
and had stated that evidence obtained in searclies conducted
pursuant to the latter type of statute traditionally had not
been admitted. 107 Ill. 2d, at 118, 481 N. E. 2d, at 708.
Because the Illinois statute did not define a substantive criminal offense, but, instead, was a procedural statute directly
authorizing warrantless searches, the Illinois Supreme Court
concluded that good-faith reliance upon that statute could not
be used to justify the admission of evidence under ari exception to the exclusionary rule. Id., at 118-119, 481 N. E. 2d,
at 708.
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - (1986), to consider
whether a good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule applies when an officer'& reliance on the
constitutionality of a statute is o~le, but
the statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional.

II
A
When evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the j~xclusionary rule usu-
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ally precludes its use in a criminal proceeding against the
victim of the illegal search and seizure. Weeks v. United
States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643
(1961). The Court has stressed that the "prime purpose" of
the exclusionary rule "is to deter future unlawful police
conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures."
United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347 (1974).
Application of the exc usionary rule "is neither intended nor
able to 'cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he
has already suffered."' United States v. Leon, 468 U. S., at
906, quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 540 (1976)
(WHITE, J., dissenting). Rather, the rule "operates as 'a
judicially created remedy designed ·-to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."' Ibid., quoting Uni~ States v. Calandra, 414
U. S., at 348.
As with any remedial device, application of the exclusionary rule properly has been restricted to those situations in
which its remedial urpose is effectively advanced. Thus, in
various circumstances, the ourt as examined whether the
rule's deterrent effect will be achieved, and has weighed the
likelihood of such deterrence against the costs of withholding
reliable information from the truth-seeking process. See,
e. g., United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 454 (1976)
(evidence obtained by state officers in violation of Fourth
Amendment may be used in federal civil proceeding because
likelihood of deterring conduct of state officers does not
outweigh societal costs imposed by exclusion); United States
v. Calandra, 414 U. S., at 351-352 (evidence obtained in
contravention of Fourth Amendment may be used in grand
jury proceedings because minimal advance in deterrence of
police misconduct is outweighed by expense of impeding role
of grand jury).

\
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In Leon, the Court held that the exclusionary rule should
not be applied to evidence obtained by a police officer whose
reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate
was objectively reasonable, even though the warrant was ultimately found to be defective. On the basis of three factors,
the Court concluded that there was no sound reason to apply
the exclusionary rule as a means of deterring misconduct on
the part of judicial officers who are responsible for issuing
warrants. First, the exclusionary rule was historically designed "to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the
errors of judges and magistrates." 468 U. S., at 916. Second, there was "no evidence suggesting that judges and
magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth
Amendment or that lawlessness among,these actors requires
application of the extreme sanction of exclusion." Ibid.
Third, and of greatest importance to the Court, there was no
basis "for believing· that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have a significant deterrent effect on the
issuing judge or magistrate." Ibid. The Court explained:
"Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in
the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions." I d., at
917. Thus, the threat of exclusion of evidence could not be
expected to deter such individuals from improperly issuing
warrants, and a judicial ruling that a warrant was defective
was sufficient to inform the judicial officer of the error made.
The Court then considered whether application of the exclusionary rule in that context could be expected to alter the
behavior of law enforcement officers. In prior cases, the
Court had observed that, because the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police officers from violating the
Fourth Amendment, evidence should be suppressed "only if
it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment."
United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 542 (1975); see also
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Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 447 (1974). Where the
officer's conduct is objectively reasonable, the Court explained in Leon,
'"[e]xcluding the evidence will not further the ends of
the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is
painfully apparent that . . . the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances. Excluding the evidence can in no way affect
his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to
do his duty."' United States v. Leon, 468 U. S., at 920,
quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 540 (WHITE, J.,
dissenting).

The Court in Leon concluded that a deterrent effect was
particularly absent when an officer, acting in objective good
faith, obtained a search warrant from a magistrate and acted
within its scope. "In most such cases, there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter." 468 U. S., at 920-921. It
is the judicial officer's responsibility to determine whether
probable cause exists to issue a warrant, and, in the ordinary
case, police officers cannot be expected to question that
determination. Because the officer's sole responsibility
after obtaining a warrant is to carry out the search pursuant
to it, applying the exclusionary rule in these circumstances
could have no deterrent effect on a future Fourth Amendment violation by the officer. ld., at 921.
B
The approach used in Leon is equally applicable to the
present case. The application of the exclusionary rule to
suppress evidence obtained by an officer acting in objectively
reasonable reliance on a statute would have as little deterrent effect on the officer's actions as would the exclusion of
evidence when an officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant. Unless a statute is clearly unconstitutional, an officer cannot be expected to question the judgment of the legislature that passed the law. If the statute is
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subsequently declared unconstitutional, excluding evidence
obtained pursuant to it prior to such a judicial declaration will
not deter future Fourth Amendment violations by an officer
who has simply fulfilled his responsibility to enforce the statute as written. To paraphrase the Court's comment in Leon:
"Penalizing the officer for the [legislature's] error, rather
than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of
Fourth Amendment violations." 468 U. S., at 921. 7
Any difference between our holding in Leon and our holding in the instant case, therefore, must rest on a difference
between the effect of the exclusion of evidence on ·udicial offie rs and the effect of the exc usio o evidence on e ·slators. A though ese two groups clearly serve 1 erent
functions in the criminal justice systerp...~. those differences are
not controlling for purposes of this case. We noted in Leon
as an initial matter that the exclusionary rule was aimed at
deterring police misconduct. 468 U. S., at 916. Thus, legislators, like judicial officers, are not the focus of the rule.
Moreover, to the extent we consider the rule's effect on legislators, our initial inquiry, as set out in Leon, is whether there
is evidence to suggest that legislators "are inclined to ignore
or subvert the Fourth Amendment." Ibid. Although legislators are not "neutral judicial officers," as are judges and
magistrates, id., at 917, neither are they "adjuncts to the law
enforcement team." Ibid. The role of legislators in the
criminal justice system is to enact laws for the purpose of
7

Indeed, the possibility of a deterrent effect may be even less when the
officer acts pursuant to a statute rather than a warrant. In Leon, the
Court pointed out: "One could argue that applying the exclusionary rule in
cases where the police failed to demonstrate probable cause in the warrant
application deters future inadequate presentations or 'magistrate shopping'
and thus promotes the ends of the Fourth Amendment. " 468 U. S., at
918. Although the Court in Leon dismissed that argument as speculative,
i bid., the possibility that a police officer might modify his behavior does not
exist at all when the officer relies on an existing statute that authorizes
warrantless inspections and does not require any pre-inspection action,
comparable to seeking a warrant, on the part of the officers.

I
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establishing and perpetuating that system. In order to fulfill this responsibility, legislators' deliberations of necessity
are significantly different from the hurried judgment of a law
enforcement officer "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333
U. S. 10, 14 (1948). Before assuming office, state legislators
are required to take an oath to support the Federal Constitution. See U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 3. Indeed, by according laws a presumption of constitutional validity, courts presume that legislatures act in a constitutional manner. See
e. g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs , 394 U. S.
802, 808-809 (1969); see generally 1 N. Singer, Sutherland on
Statutory Construction § 2.01 (4th ed. 1985).
There is no evidence suggesting that..Congress or state legislatures have enacted a significant number of statutes permitting warrantless administrative searches violative of the
Fourth Amendment. Legislatures generally have confined
their efforts to authorizing administrative searches of specific
categories of businesses that require regulation, and the resulting statutes usually have been held to be constitutional.
See, e. g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981); United
States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970); United States v.
Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 651 F. 2d 532
(CA8 1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 1016 (1982); see also 3
W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.2, pp. 132-134, n. 89.1
(Supp. 1986) (collecting cases). Thus, we are given no basis
for believing that legislators are inclined to subvert their
oaths and the Fourth Amendment and that "lawlessness
among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of exclusion." United States v. Leon, 468 U. S., at 916.
Even if we were to conclude that legislators are different in
certain relevant respects from magistrates, because legislators are not officers of the judicial system, the next inquiry
necessitated by Leon is whether exclusion of evidence seized
pursuant to a statute subsequently declared unconstitutional
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will "have a significant deterrent effect," ibid., on legislators
enacting such statutes. Respondents have offered us no reason to believe that applying the exclusionary rule will have
such an effect. Legislators enact statutes for broad, programmatic purposes, not for the purpose of procuring evidence in particular criminal investigations. Thus, it is logical to assume that the greatest deterrent to the enactment of
unconstitutional statutes by a legislature is the power of the
courts to invalidate such statutes. Invalidating a statute informs the legislature of its constitutional error, affects the
admissibility of all evidence obtained subsequent to the constitutional ruling, and often results in the legislature's enacting a modified and constitutional version of the statute, as
happened in this very case. There is ~qthing to indicate that
applying the exclusionary rule to evidence seized pursuant to
the statute prior to the declaration of its invalidity will act as
a significant, additional deterrent. 8 Moreover, to the extent
that application of the exclusionary rule could provide some
incremental deterrent, that possible benefit must be weighed
against the "substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule." ld., at 907. 9 When we indulge in such weighing,
It is possible, perhaps, that there are some legislators who, for political purposes, are possessed with a zeal to enact a particular unconstitutionally restrictive statute, and who will not be deterred by the fact that a
court might later declare the law unconstitutional. But we doubt whether
a legislator possessed with such fervor, and with such disregard for his
oath to support the Constitution, would be significantly deterred by the
possibility that the exclusionary rule would preclude the introduction of
evidence in a certain number of prosecutions. Moreover, just as we were
not willing to assume in Leon that the possibility of magistrates' acting as
"rubber stamps for the police" was a problem of major proportions, see 468
U. S., at 916, n. 14, we are not willing to assume now that there exists a
significant problem of legislators who perform their legislative duties with
indifference to the constitutionality of the statutes they enact. If future
empirical evidence ever should undermine that assumption, our conclusions
may be revised accordingly. See United States v. Leon, 468 U. S., at
927-928 (concurring opinion).
9
In Leon, the Court pointed out: "An objectionable collateral conse8
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we are convinced that applying the exclusionary rule in this
context is unjustified.
Respondents argue that the result in this case should be
different from that in Leon because a statute authorizing
warrantless administrative searches affects an entire industry and a large number of citizens, while the issuance of a
defective warrant affects only one person. This distinction
is not persuasive. In determining whether to apply the exclusionary rule, a court should examine whether such application will advance the deterrent objective of the rule. Although the number of individuals affected may be considered
when "weighing the costs and benefits," ibid., of applying the
exclusionary rule, the simple fact that many are affected by a
statute is not sufficient to tip the balance if the deterrence of
Fourth Amendment violations would not be advanced in any
meaningful way. 10
We also do not believe that defendants will choose not to
contest the validity of statutes if they are unable to benefit
directly by the subsequent exclusion of evidence, thereby
resulting in statutes evading constitutional review. First, in
Leon, we explicitly rejected the argument that the good-faith
exception adopted in that case would "preclude review of the
constitutionality of the search or seizure" or would cause
defendants to lose their incentive to litigate meritorious
quence of this interference with the criminal justice system's truth-finding
function is that some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced sentences as a result of favorable plea bargains." I d., at 907.
10
Moreover, it is not always true that the issuance of defective warrants
will affect only a few persons. For example, it is possible that before this
Court's rather controversial decision in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108
(1964), see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 238, and n. 11 (1983), a number
of magistrates believed that probable cause could be established solely on
the uncorroborated allegations of a police officer and a significant number
of warrants may have been issued on that basis. Until that view was adjusted by this Court's ruling, many persons may have been affected by the
syst~nting of warrants based on erroneous views of the standards
necessary to establish probable cause.
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Fourth Amendment claims. We stated that "the magnitude
of the benefit conferred on defendants by a successful [suppression] motion makes it unlikely that litigation of colorable
claims will be substantially diminished." I d., at 924 and
n. 25. In an effort to suppress evidence, a defendant has no
reason not to argue that a police officer's reliance on a warrant or statute was not objectively reasonable and therefore
cannot be considered to have been in good faith. Second, unlike a person searched pursuant to a warrant, a person subject to a statute authorizing searches without a warrant or
probable cause may bring an action seeking a declaration that
the statute is unconstitutional and an injunction barring its
implementation. Indeed, that course of action was followed
with respect to the statute at issue in this case. Several
businesses brought a declaratory ju~gment suit in federal
district court challenging § 5-401(e) of the Illinois Vehicle
Code, and the provision was declared unconstitutional. See
Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 518 F. Supp., at
585. Subsequent to that declaration, respondents, in their
state-court criminal trial, challenged the admissibility of evidence obtained pursuant to the statute. App. 13-17.u
The Court noted in Leon that the "good-faith" exception to
the exclusionary rule would not apply "where the issuing
11
Other plaintiffs have challenged state statutes on Fourth Amendment
grounds in declaratory judgment actions. See California Restaurant
Assn. v. Henning, 173 Cal.App. 3d 1069, 219 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1985) (organization of restaurant owners challenged constitutionality of state statute
vesting authority in State Labor Commissioner to issue subpoenas compelling production of books and records); Hawaii Psychiatric Soc. v.
Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028 (Haw. 1979) (action to enjoin enforcement of
state statute that authorized issuance of administrative inspection warrants to search records of Medicaid providers); Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F . 2d
1462 (CA9 1984) (parents sought declaration that school board guidelines
authorizing warrantless searches by school principal and teacher were unconstitutional); see also Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade Assn. v. Maryland, 500 F . Supp. 834, 848-849 (Md. 1980) (challenging constitutionality of
Maryland Drug Paraphernalia Act as violative of the Fourth Amendment
and other constitutional provisions).
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magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role in the manner
condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U. S. 319
(1979)," or where the warrant was so facially deficient "that
the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be
valid." 468 U. S., at 923. Similar constraints apply to the
exception to the exclusionary rule we recognize today. A
statute cannot support objectively reasonable reliance if, in
passing the statute, the legislature wholly abandoned its
responsibility to enact constitutional laws. Nor can a law
enforcement officer be said to have acted in good-faith reliance upon a statute if its provisions are such· that a reasonable officer should have known that the statute was unconstitutional. Cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818
(1982) ("government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known"). 12
12
The Illinois Supreme Court did not consider whether an officer's objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute justifies an exception to the exclusionary rule. Instead, as noted above, the court rested its holding on the
existence of a "substantive-procedural dichotomy," which it would derive
from this Court's opinion in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31 (1979).
See 107 Ill. 2d 107, 118, 481 N. E. 2d 703, 708 (1985). We do not believe
the distinction relied upon by the Illinois court is relevant in deciding
whether the exclusionary rule should be applied in this case.
This Court in DeFillippo, which was decided before Leon, drew a distinction between evidence obtained when officers rely upon a statute that
defines a substantive crime, and evidence obtained when officers rely upon
a statute that authorizes searches without a warrant or probable cause.
The Court stated that evidence obtained in searches conducted pursuant to
the latter type of statute traditionally had been excluded. 443 U. S., at
39. None of the cases cited in DeFillippo in support of the distinction,
however, addressed the question whether a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should be recognized when an officer's reliance on a statute
was objectively reasonable. Rather, those cases simply evaluated the constitutionality of particular statutes, or their application, that authorized
searches without a warrant or probable cause. See Torres v. Puerto Rico,
442 U.S 465 (1979) (statute that allowed police to search luggage of any

..
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III
Applying the principle enunciated in this case, we necessarily conclude that Detective McNally's reliance on the IlliOn several occanois statute was o~ble.
sions, this Court has upheld legislative schemes that
authorized warrantless administrative searches of heavily
13

person arriving at an airport or pier in Puerto Rico, without any requirement of probable cause, violated Fourth Amendment); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973) (search pursuant to statute that allowed United States Border Patrol to conduct warrantless searches within
a "reasonable distance" from border, and regulation that defined such distance as 100 air miles, and without any requirement of probable cause violated Fourth Amendment); Berger v. New York , 388 U. S. 41 (1967) (statute that authorized court-ordered eavesdropping' without requirement that
information to be seized be particularized violated Fourth Amendment).
See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968) (search pursuant to statute that allowed officers to search an individual upon "reasonable suspicion" that he was engaged in criminal activity was unreasonable because it
was conducted without probable cause). See United States v. Leon, 468
U. S., at 912, n. 8.
For purposes of deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule, we see
no valid reason to distinguish between statutes that define substantive
criminal offenses and statutes that authorize warrantless administrative
searches. In either situation, application of the exclusionary rule will not
deter a violation of the Fourth Amendment by police officers, because the
officers are merely carrying out their responsibilities in implementing the
statute. Similarly, in either situation, there is no basis for assuming that
the exclusionary rule is necessary or effective in deterring a legislature
from passing an unconstitutional statute. There is no basis for applying
the exclusionary rule to exclude evidence obtained when a law enforcement
officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute, regardless of
whether the statute may be characterized as "substantive" or
"procedural."
13
The question whether the Illinois statute in effect at the time of
McNally's search was, in fact , unconstitutional is not before us. We are
concerned here solely with whether the detective acted in good-faith reliance upon an apparently valid statute. The constitutionality of a statutory
scheme authorizing warrantless searches of automobile junkyards will be
considered in No. 86-80, New York v. Burger, cert. granted, - - U. S.
(1986).
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regulated industries. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594
(1981) (inspections of underground and surface mines pursuant to Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977); United
States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (inspections of firearms dealers under Gun Control Act of 1968); Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970) (inspections of liquor dealers under 26 U. S. C. §§ 5146(b) and 7606
(1964 ed.)). It has recognized that an inspection program
may be a necessary component of regulation in certain industries, and has acknowledged that unannounced, warrantless
inspections may be necessary "if the law is to be properly
enforced and inspection made effective." United States v.
Biswell, 406 U. S., at 316; Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S., at
603. Thus, the Court explained in Donovan that its -prior
decisions
"make clear that a warrant may not be constitutionally
required when Congress has reasonably determined that
warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme and the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of
commercial property cannot helpbut be aware that his
property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes." I d., at 600.

U

In Donovan, the Court pointed out that a valid inspection
scheme must provide, "in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application ... a constitutiona)l1adequate substitute for a warrant." !d., at 603. In'-.tMarshall v. Barlow's
Inc., 436 U. S. 307 (1978), to be sure, the Court held that a
warrantless administrative search under § 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, was invalid, partly because the "authority to make warrantless searches devolve[ d)
almost unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative officers, particularly those in the field, as to when to
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search and whom to search." I d., at 323. 14 In contrast, the
Court in Donovan concluded that the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Act of 1977 imposed a system of inspection that
was sufficiently tailored to the problems of unsafe conditions
in mines and was sufficiently pervasive that it checked the
discretion of government officers and established "a predictable and guided federal regulatory presence." 452 U. S., at
604.
Under the standards established in these cases, Detective
MeN al~l~~~llinois statute authorizing warrantless inspectiOns of licensees was o ~ec 1 e y reasonable.
In ruling- oiltfie-~fftuflomility , the Illinois
Supreme Court recognized that the licensing and inspection
scheme furthered a st~est, for it helped to "facilitate the discovery and prevention of automobile thefts."
107 Ill. 2d, at 116, 481 N. E. 2d, at 707. The court further
concluded that it was "reasonable to assume that warrantless
administrative searches are necessary in order to adequately
control the theft of automobiles and automotive parts."
Ibid. The Court of A eals for the Seventh Circuit, upholding the amended version o
e s atute, pointed out that
used-car and automotive-parts dealers in Illinois "are put on
notice that they are entering a field subject to extensive state
regulation." See Bionic Auto Parts & Sales , Inc. v.
Fahner, 721 F . 2d, at 1079. The Illinois statute was thus
directed at one specific and heavily regulated industry, the
authorized warrantless searches were necessary to the effectiveness of the inspection system, and licensees were put on
"The Court expressly limited its holding in Barlow's, to the inspection
provisions of the Act. It noted that the "reasonableness of a warrantless
search . . . will depend upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy
guarantees of each statute," and that some statutes "apply only to a single
industry, where regulations might already be so pervasive that a
Collonade-Biswell exception to the warrant requirement could apply."
436 U. S., at 321.
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notice that their businesses would be subject to inspections
pursuant to the state administrative scheme.
According to the Illinois Supreme Court, the statute failed
to pass constitutional muster solely because the statute
"vested State officials with too much discretion to decide
who, when, and how long to search." 107 Ill. 2d, at 116, 481
N. E. 2d, at 707. Assuming, as we do for purposes of this
case, that the Illinois Supreme Court was correct in its constitutional analysis, this defect in the statute was not sufficiently obvious so as to render a police officer's reliance upon
the statute objectively unreasonable. The statute provided
that searches could be conducted "at any reasonable time
during the night or day," and seemed to limit the scope of the
inspections to the records the businesses were required to
maintain and to the business premises· "for the purposes of
determining the accuracy of required records." Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 95 112, ~ 5-401(e) (1981). While statutory provisions that circumscribe officers' discretion may be important
in establishing a statute's constitutionality, 15 the additional
restrictions on discretion that might have been necessary are
not so obvious that a reasonably objective police officer would
have realized the statute was unconstitutional without
them. 16 We therefore conclude that Detective MeN ally
For example, the amended version of the Illinois statute, upheld by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, incorporated the following: (1)
the inspections were to be initiated while business was being conducted; (2)
each inspection was not to last more than 24 hours; (3) the licensee or his
representative was entitled to be present during the inspection; and (4) no
more than six inspections of one business location could be conducted
within any six-month period except pursuant to a search warrant or in response to public complaints about violations. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 95 112,
~ 5-403 (1985).
16
Indeed, less than a year and a half before the search of respondents'
yard, the Supreme Court of Indiana upheld an Indiana statute, authorizing
warrantless administrative searches of automobile businesses, that was
similar to the Illinois statute and did not include extensive restrictions on
police officers' discretion. See State v. Tindell, 272 Ind. 479, 399 N. E. 2d
746 (1980).
15
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relied, in good faith, on a statute that appeared legitimately
to allow a warrantless administrative search of respondents'
business. 17
Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois
is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for furthe;pr0ceedings not inc~nsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

17

Respondents also argue that Detective MeN ally acted outside the
scope of the statute, and that such action constitutes an alternative ground
for suppressing the evidence even if we recognize, as we now do, a goodfaith exception when officers reasonably rely o~u;tatutes and act within the
scope of those statutes. We have observed, see n. 5, supra, that the trial
court indicated that McNally may have acted outside the scope of his statutory authority. In its brief to the Illinois Supreme Court, the State commented that "[McNally's] search was properly limited to examining the
records and inventory of the Action Iron and Metal Company." 1 Record ,
Brief for Appellant 26. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, made no
reference to the trial court's discussion regarding the scope of McNally's
authority; instead, it affirmed the suppression of the evidence on the
ground that a good-faith exception was not applicable in the context of the
statute before it.
We anticipate that the Illinois Supreme Court on remand will consider
whether the trial court made a definitive ruling regarding the scope of the
statute, whether the State preserved its objection to any such ruling, and,
if so, whether the trial court properly interpreted the statute. At this
juncture, we decline the State's invitation to recognize an exception for an
officer who erroneously, but in good faith, believes he is acting within the
scope of a statute. Not only would such a ruling be premature, but it does
not follow inexorably from today's decision. As our opinion makes clear,
the question whether the exclusionary rule is applicable in a particular context depends significantly upon the actors who are making the relevant decision that the rule is designed to influence. The answer to this question
might well be different when police officers act outside the scope of a statute, albeit in good faith. In that context, the relevant actors are not legislators or magistrates, but police officers who concededly are "engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v.
United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948).
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This opinion is so long, and makes remarks about so many issues unnecessary to the decision, that I have read it over twice
in hopes of "catching" any potential problems.
There is no doubt that the opinion reaches the right result:
evidence obtained from searches and seizures made in objectively
reasonable

reliance on a

tional is admissible.

statute subsequently held unconsti tu-

JUSTICE BLACKMON's basic reasoning also is

correct, from your perspective:
deterrent

purpose,

and excluding

deter unconstitutional behavior.

the exclusionary rule serves a
this

evidence

As you noted,

is

unlikely

to

the opinion re-

lies on Calandra and Stone v. Powell.

------

The opinion makes the excellent point that deterrence is even
less likely here than in Leon, because there is no possibility of
"magistrate shopping" by police.

Also,

------...._.;;.

persons who may be sub-

ject to search have an incentive to seek a declaration that the
statute is unconstitutional, whereas a person searched pursuant
to a defective warrant may have less incentive to challenge it.
---)

A~

You would perhaps prefer that footnote 8, p,

11, be omitted, since it discusses the possibility that legislators may knowingly enact unconstitutional statutes out of "zeal"
and for "political purposes."

Perhaps JUSTICE BLACKMON would re-

page 2.

phrase one or two sentences to say that the Court is unwilling to
assume that legislators routinely disregard their oath to uphold
the federal Constitution.
I would omit footnote 10, p. 12, because I do not think it is
convincing.

A decision of this Court is likely to affect many

individuals; a single warrant will not affect so many.
contains a sufficient argument:
affected

by

an

The text

although the number of persons

unconstitutional

statute

is

entitled

to

some

weight, it does not "tip the balance of deterrence."
The discussion of the limits to the good faith exception on
p. 14 appears to track Leon exactly.

The long footnote on the

distinction between "substantive" and "procedural" statutes boils
down to a simple statement, with which I agree, that there is no

--------;

meaningful basis for this distinction.

Note 12, pp.l4-15.

The discussion of the application of the exception to this
case in Part III looks fine to me.
hear

arguments in v;;ew York v.

As you know, the Court will

Burger,

No.

86-80,

in February.

This case presents the question whether a similar statute authorizing warrantless
York is valid.
ute is valid.

searches

of

automobile

"chop shops"

in New

I think you will be of the opinion that the statIf so, JUSTICE BLACKMON's language may be helpful.

I recommend a join.
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Dear Harry:
I am sending you a separate join note.
This is merely to mention a couple of points for
your consideration. Footnote 8 discusses the possibility
that legislators may knowingly enact unconstitutional statutes out of "zeal", and for "political purposes". It seems
to me that. this js rath~r unlikely. Perhaps it would be
bettP.r to say that we are unwUling to assume that legislators would disregard their oath to act in acco-cd with law in
this resp~ct.
I would prefer to omit footnote 10, p. 12, because
I ~o not think it . ts entirely convincing. A decision of
thts Court coulo affect manv individuals, whereas a single
warrant iR likely to have only a limited effect. I think
you-c text is entirely adequate.
The foregoing are quite minor, and my join ia uncondition.a l. I think you opinion is quite excellent.
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Justice Blackmun
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I purposefully inserted the material to which you
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will say in dissent.
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it in mind to say something about the motivation of legislators. For now, I would prefer to let matters lie quiet until
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Dear Harry:
I would be pleased to join your op1n1on in the above case.
I have one suggestion which may forestall future litigation.
As I understand our holding, here, as in Leon (see 468

u.s., at 897-898, n.20), , we are applying an objective test:

If
a reasonable police officer would have considered the statute
valid, the product of the search is admissible. We do not
conduct an inquiry into the subjective knowledge and belief of
the particular officer involved. It seems to me that some
explicit indication of that (along the lines of the first two
sentences of the cited footnote in Leon) would be helpful. At a
minimum, the last sentence of the penultimate paragraph of the
opinion should be revised to read somewhat as follows:
We therefore conclude that, since Detective McNally was
objectively reasonable in acting under a statute that
appeared legitimately to allow a warrantless
administrative search of respondents' business, the
product of that search was admissible.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
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